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I. INTRODUCTION*
Massage parlors are not a recent American phenomenon. They were a
pervasive and, to many, a troublesome phenomenon during the "winning
of the West."' In 1897, the Supreme Court determined that one advertise-
ment by women inviting men to their "Baths" and "Massage" rooms was
too obscene to be printed.2 In recent years there has been a sudden increase
* The student contributors are Andrew A. Jaxa-Debicki, William C. Matthews, Jr., and
James F. Stutts.
1. Ex parte Maki, 56 Cal. App.2d 635, 133 P.2d 64 (1943). "Respondent points out that in
the city of Los Angeles, in 1915, the prevalence of sex evils arising out of massage parlors
caused the city council then to enact [a massage parlor law] as a safeguard against the
deterioration of the social life of the community." 133 P.2d at 69.
2. Dunlop v. United States, 165 U.S. 486, 497-501 (1897). "The alleged obscene and inde-
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of interest in and concern about massage parlors.3 This note examines the
most prevalent legal problems generated by the regulation of massage
parlors: the relationship between the police power and massage parlor
establishments, the constitutional concerns of equal protection and sub-
stantive due process and the various means used in regulating these estab-
lishments.
II. MASSAGE PARLORS AND THE POLICE POWER
The regulation of massage parlors is accomplished under the police
power residing within each state. Mr. Justice Holmes noted that the police
power "may be put forth in aid of what is sanctioned by usage, or held by
the prevailing morality or strong preponderant opinion to be greatly and
immediately necessary to the public welfare." 4 It is clear that the state
possesses broad power to protect the moral climate of the community.
However, since the salient characteristic of the police power is adaptability
to changed circumstances and opinion,' whether or not an isolated exercise
of this power is valid may understandably be the subject of much dispute.
Challenges to the exercise of the police power are common because its
exercise necessarily collides with individual liberty.
7
cent matter consisted of advertisements by women, soliciting or offering inducements for the
visits of men, usually 'refined gentlemen,' to their rooms, sometimes under the disguise of
'Baths' and 'Massage,' and oftener for the mere purpose of acquaintance." Id. at 501. One of
the errors the appellant raised was the misleading nature of the District Attorney's definition
of massage,, which he shared with the jury: "Now, gentlemen, it is not necessary for me to
tell you what the massage treatment is; how a man is stripped naked, from the sole of his
feet to the crown of his head, and is rubbed with the hands." Id. at 498. The problems of the
massage parlor phenomenon and the public's apprehension of massage parlors seem to have
changed very little in the past eighty years.
3. Writers have used the topic as a springboard for clever titles of articles. "Aye, There's
the Rub: Unlicensed Massage Parlors," 24 NATIONAL REVIEW 963 (1972); "Body Shops: Mas-
sage Parlors," TIME, December 15, 1975, at 48. A well-written sociological study of the owners,
technicians, and patrons of message parlors appears in an article blandly entitled "Massage
Parlors," 11 Socigrv, Nov., 1973, at 63.
4. Noble State Bank v. Haskell, 219 U.S. 104, 111 (1911). "[Ihe police power extends to
all the great public needs." Id. citing Camfield v. United States, 167 U.S. 518 (1897).
5. Regulations forbidding lewd and indecent exposure, distribution of obscene books and
films, prostitution and pimping have been sustained. See generally 6 E. MCQbILLIN, MUNICI-
PAL CORPORATIONS § 24.112 et seq. (3d rev. ed. 1969); 1 C. ANTIEAU, MUNICIPAL CORPORATION
LAW § 6.07 et seq. (1975).
6. Block v. Hirsh, 256 U.S. 135 (1921). "[C]ircumstances may so change in time or so
differ in space as to clothe with such an interest what at other times or in other places would
be a matter of purely private concern." Id. at 155.
7. Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502, 525-39 (1934), provides a fruitful discussion of the
conflict between individual liberty and the interests of the government in regulation for the
public good. See also Crowley v. Christensen, 137 U.S. 86, 89-94 (1890).
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The subject matter which a locality may regulate pursuant to the police
power is limited by two important principles. First, a locality may regulate
only in areas where the state has given it authority.8 The validity of such
delegation of authority will depend upon the language of the grant and the
judicial interpretation thereof.9 A second common problem in the locality's
exercise of the police power is pre-emption of any regulation by the state
or federal government. In Lancaster v. Municipal Court, '5 the court held
that a massage parlor law prohibiting massages by the opposite sex consti-
tuted a regulation of sexual conduct, an area which had earlier been held"
to have been pre-empted by the state to the exclusion of all local regula-
tion. It is frequently held, however, that such state and local regulation
may coincide with one another when the state has not pre-empted an entire
area of law. 2 Because of the supremacy clause of the Constitution, 3 a
locality is also barred from enacting any statute which would conflict with
any federal law. In Joseph v. House4 and Cianciolo v. Members of City
Council,5 two courts pointed to portions of the Civil Rights Act of 1964
which appeared to conflict with the questioned local massage ordinances. 6
The Supreme Court in 'Crowley v. Christensen7 drew a distinction be-
8. 6 E. MCQUILLIN, MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS § 24.35 et seq. (3d rev. ed. 1969).
9. Id.
10. 6 Cal. 3d 805, 100 Cal. Rptr. 609, 494 P.2d 681 (1972), rev'g 18 Cal. App. 3d 919, 96
Cal. Rptr. 257 (1971).
11. In re Lane, 58 Cal. 2d 99, 372 P.2d 897, 22 Cal. Rptr. 857 (1962).
12. Colorado Springs Amusements, Ltd. v. Rizzo, 524 F.2d 571 (3d Cir. 1975). In deter-
mining whether a pre-emption problem existed, the court noted that under Pennsylvania law
"unless the Commonwealth has explicitly claimed the authority itself, or unless there is such
actual, material conflict between the state and local powers that only by striking down the
local power can the power of the wider constituency be protected" a municipality is not
prohibited from legislating in a particular area of the law. Id. at 577, quoting from United
Tavern Owners v. Philadelphia School District, 441 Pa. 274, 280, 272 A.2d 868, 871 (1971).
See also Wayside Restaurant, Inc. v. City of Virginia Beach, 215 Va. 231, 208 S.E.2d 51
(1974); 6 E. McQUILLIN, MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS § 24.54 (3d rev. ed. 1969). In North Caro-
lina, the pre-emption concern has been raised twice but circumvented. In Smith v. Keator,
285 N.C. 530, 206 S.E.2d 203, appeal dismissed, 419 U.S. 1043 (1974), the court held that
massage was not an art of healing subject to sole state control in spite of a contrary ruling by
the Commissioner of the Revenue. Thus, the problem of pre-emption was avoided by holding
that massagists were subject in the case to no state licensing or regulation. In Brown v.
Brannon, 399 F. Supp. 133 (M.D.N.C. 1975), the court referred the pre-emption concern to
the state courts after disposing of the other bases for federal jurisdiction.
13. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2.
14. 353 F. Supp. 367 (E.D. Va. 1973) (preliminary injunction), aff'd sub. nom. Joseph v.
Blair, 482 F.2d 575 (4th Cir. 1973).
15. 376 F. Supp. 719 (E.D. Tenn. 1974).
16. For a more thorough discussion of the conflict the courts have seen between these
ordinances and the Civil Rights Act of 1964, see section IV.A. 2 infra.
17. 137 U.S. 86 (1890).
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tween harmless occupations and ones harmful in themselves. In Crowley,
the Court determined the validity of an ordinance preventing the estab-
lishment of a saloon without the prior consent of the police commissioners
or twelve citizens owning real estate in the same block. Despite the fact
that the commissioners' consent was arbitrary and standardless and that
there might not have been twelve citizens owning real estate on the same
block who could approve the saloon, the Court upheld the denial of the
liquor license." Under Crowley, occupations which appeared harmful in
themselves were subject to much greater regulation than useful or harmless
activities."1 The Supreme Court determined in Murphy v. California that
an activity was harmful in itself if it appeared, apart from any indiscretion
or impropriety of the owner or operator, to carry within itself the seeds of
evil which necessarily flowed from the conduct of such business.20 Activi-
ties which tended to create disorder or harm were often treated as "privi-
leges" because they might be totally prohibited by the locality.2' The en-
18. The Court distinguished this situtation from that of Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356
(1886), in which arbitrary discretion in the licensing of laundries was held unconstitutional,
but noting that Yick Wo involved an occupation "harmless in itself and useful to the com-
munity" whereas Crowley involved an occupation that "may ... be entirely prohibited, or
subjected to such restrictions as the governing authority of the city may prescribe." Crowley
v. Christensen, 137 U.S. 86, 94 (1890). Because alcohol "leads to neglect of business and
waste of property and general demoralization..." a saloon may "be entirely prohibited, or
be permitted under such conditions as will limit to the utmost its evils." Id. at 91.
19. The list of activities deemed harmful in themselves grew in subsequent years to include
exhibitions, Higgins v. Lacroix, 119 Minn. 145, 137 N.W. 417 (1912); dances, 7 E. MCQUILU.N,
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS § 24.209 et seq. (3d rev. ed. 1969); fortune telling, White v. Adams,
233 Ark. 241, 343 S.W.2d 793 (1961); billiards, Murphy v. California, 225 U.S. 623 (1912);
and pinball and gambling, Bunzel v. City of Golden, 150 Colo. 276, 372 P.2d 161 (1962). Very
recently the Supreme Court dismissed an appeal of an appellant who claimed that a munici-
pality could not constitutionally prohibit bona-fide amusement-only coin-operated games
solely because they fall within the "pinball" generic category. Albert Simon, Inc. v. Myerson,
423 U.S. 908 (1975).
20. Murphy v. California, 225 U.S. 623 (1912). "That the keeping of a billiard hall has a
harmful tendency is a fact requiring no proof, and incapable of being controverted by the
testimony of the plaintiff that his business was lawfully conducted, free from gaming or
anything which could affect the morality of the community or of his patrons. The fact that
there had been no disorder or open violation of the law does not prevent the municipal
authorities from taking legislative notice of the idleness and other evils which result from the
maintenance of a resort where it is the business of one to stimulate others to play beyond
what is proper for legitimate recreation." Id. at 629. Thus, in Ohio ex rel. Clarke v. Decke-
bach, 274 U.S. 392 (1927), the statutory denial of a pool hall license to aliens was upheld in
light of the nature of the business.
21. Booth v. Illinois, 184 U.S. 425 (1902):
The argument then is, that the statute directly forbids the citizen from pursuing a
calling which, in itself, involves no element of immorality, and therefore by such
prohibition it invades his liberty as guaranteed by the supreme law of the land . ...
[Vol. 10:597
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joyment of such privileges was held to be subject to much more stringent
regulation than the exercise of inalienable occupational rights.
22
The Supreme Court, however, has rejected the rights-privileges dichot-
omy which it had drawn in earlier decisions.? In general, courts have been
moving away from providing minimal protection to activities deemed
harmful in themselves. Many decisions have questioned the limitations
upon a due process attack imposed by Crowley when dealing with an
activity considered to be potentially harmful. While stringent regulation
or prohibition of liquor sales (the direct progeny of Crowley) has often been
upheld,2 14 arbitrary discretion and unreasonable distinctions have been
held invalid even in this area.? In other areas, courts have struck down
statutes dealing with activities traditionally considered harmful in them-
Is it true that the legislature is without power to forbid or suppress a particular kind
of business, where such business, properly and honestly conducted, may not, in itself,
be immoral? We think not. A calling may not in itself be immoral, and yet the tend-
ency of what is generally or ordinarily or often done in pursuing that calling may be
towards that which is admittedly immoral or pernicious. If, looking at all the circum-
stances that attend, or which may ordinarily attend, the pursuit of a particular calling,
the State thinks that certain admitted evils cannot be successfully reached unless that
calling be actually prohibited, the courts cannot interfere, unless, looking through
mere forms and at the substance of the matter, they can say that the statute enacted
professedly to protect the public morals has no real or substantial relation to that
object, but is a clear, unmistakable infringement of rights secured by the fundamental
law. Id. at 429.
White v. Adams, 233 Ark. 241, 343 S.W.2d 793, 794 (1961) (fortune telling not a "lawful
calling pursued as a matter of right"); Bunzel v. City of Golden, 150 Colo. 276, 372 P.2d 161
(1962).
22. Bunzel v. City of Golden, 150 Colo. 276, 372 P.2d 161 (1962). See also Morgan,
Protection of Natural and Fundamental Rights, 2 ARK. L. RE v. 203 (1948).
23. Compare Barsky v. Board of Regents, 347 U.S. 442, 451 (1954) ("Such practice [of
medicine] is a privilege granted by the State under its substantially plenary power to fix the
terms of admission.") with Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners, 353 U.S. at 239 n.5. ("We
need not enter into a discussion whether the practice of law is a 'right' or a 'privilege.'
Regardless of how the State's grant of permission to engage in this occupation is character-
ized, it is sufficient to say that a person cannot be prevented from practicing except for valid
reasons." See Van Alstyne, The Demise of the Right-Privilege Distinction in Constitutional
Law, 81 HARv. L. REv. 1439 (1968).
24. Samuels v. McCurdy, 267 U.S. 188 (1925) (The state "has the power absolutely to
prohibit.").
25. Hornsby v. Allen, 326 F.2d 605 (5th Cir. 1964); Constantineau v. Grager, 302 F. Supp.
861 (E.D. Wis. 1969); Segal v. Simpgon, 121 So. 2d 790 (Fla. 1960) ("bottle clubs" with live
entertainment were subject to ten times the licensing fee imposed upon the ordinary bar-
restaurant). Although appellants' establishments were "of a character perhaps not affirma-
tively favored by law, [they] are not mala in se nor mala prohibita and are therefore to be
considered lawful business enterprises . . . . [The prohibition of a business not per se
dangerous, immoral, or contrary to well established public policy may not be accomplished
under the power to license." Id. at 792.
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selves because the statutes represented unreasonable exercises on the po-
lice power" or arbitrary action by licensing officials.27
Massage parlors, because massage has never been classified as an activ-
ity harmful in itself, have escaped the virtual prohibition possible under
the older analysis represented by Crowley. Recognizing the distinction
between activities harmful in themselves and those which present only the
possibility of harm due to mismanagement, courts have consistently noted
that the giving of a massage is not per se harmful, but rather a service of
substantial benefit, especially to the infirm.2
In summary, the distinction between harmful and harmless occupations
has lost most, if not all, of its vitality. Many courts are now requiring
procedural due process steps to be followed in the regulation of even those
activities deemed harmful per se. An intermediate classification appears
to have been drawn to identify activities which, although ordinarily benefi-
cial to the community, might become harmful due to mismanagement. 9
Since massage treatments are per se beneficial to the community and
present problems of illicit sex only when mismanaged or used as a subter-
fuge, the municipality must seek to regulate in order to prevent such
indiscretions rather than prohibit the profession altogether.
III. CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES: AN OVERVIEW
Regulations controlling the operation of massage parlors have been the
object of litigation which has raised a variety of constitutional issues. The
26. Antonello v. City of San Diego, 16 Cal. App. 3d 161, 93 Cal. Rptr. 820, cert. denied,
404 U.S. 912 (1971) ("peep show"); Bruner v. City of Danville, 394 S.W.2d 939, 943 (Ky. 1965)
("to outlaw public dances completely would be unreasonable"); Devereaux v. Genesse Twp.,
211 Mich. 38, 177 N.W. 967 (1920) (arbitrary discretion not possible in the licensing of "public
billiard and pool rooms, dance halls, bowling alleys, and soft drink emporiums"); Garden
Spot Market v. Byrnes, 378 P.2d 220 (Mont. 1963) (trading stamps).
27. Tillberg v. Township of Kearney, 103 N.J. Super. 324, 247 A.2d 161 (1968).
28. Ex parte Maki, 56 Cal. App. 2d 635, 133 P.2d 64 (1943). "[T]he practice of adminis-
tering a massage is in itself an innocent and worthy vocation and fulfills a popular demand
of the ill and the injured. ... Id. at 67. J.S.K. Enterprises, Inc. v. City of Lacey, 6 Wash.
App. 43, 492 P.2d 600, 607 (1971) ("Massage is one of the oldest forms of therapy.").
29. This would represent a shift away from Booth v. Illinois, 184 U.S. 425 (1902), which
lumped together activities harmful in themselves and activities which might become harmful
due to mismanagement. Id. at 429. Murphy v. California, 225 U.S. 623 (1912), reflects this
shift by distinguishing these two types of harmful activities. See note 20 supra. The Court
has more recently showed concern for any form of stereotyping. See text, section III.D. infra.
Massage parlors which through mismanagement have become havens for illicit sexual con-
duct may be attacked through "disorderly house" or "nuisance per se" statutes. See Flannery
v. City of Norfolk, 216 Va. 362, 218 S.E.2d 730 (1975), petition for cert. filed, 44 U.S.L.W.
3417 (U.S. Jan. 8, 1976) (No. 966); Hensley v. City of Norfolk, 216 Va. 369, 218 S.E.2d 735
(1975).
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equal protection clause has been the basis for challenges to ordinances
which have apparently singled out massage parlors for more burdensome
regulation than other businesses." Other ordinances prohibiting female
massage parlor employees from massaging male customers have been at-
tacked on equal protection grounds as being sexually discriminatory.3 1
Courts have also dealt with the issues of whether massage parlor ordi-
nances constituted denials of due process, 3 invasions of privacy'  or undue
interference with the right to pursue a legitimate occupation.34 In short, the
apparently inevitable conflict between a municipality's intent to pursue its
interest in regulating commercial and moral activities and the massage
parlor operator's desire to legitimize his business has been the source of a
fairly significant amount of constitutional litigation.
A. THE RIGHT TO SEXUAL PRIVACY
An intriguing issue raised by massage parlor regulation is whether, in
view of an apparent trend toward the recognition of an expanded area of
sexual privacy, 5 regulations aimed at sexual immorality extend the police
power too far into protected zones of privacy. Thus, even if a massage
parlor functions as a house of prostitution, 3 the state's interest in prohibit-
30. See, e.g., Kisley v. City of Falls Church, 212 Va. 693, 187 S.E.2d 168 (1972), appeal
dismissed, 409 U.S. 907 (1972) (differentiation between massage parlor and barber shops not
violative of equal protection clause); Cheek v. City of Charlotte, 273 N.C. 293, 160 S.E.2d 18
(1968) (different regulation for massage parlors than for barber shops and YMCA violated
equal protection clause).
31. See, e.g., J.S.K. Enterprises, Inc. v. City of Lacey, 6 Wash. App. 43, 492 P.2d 600
(Wash. Ct. App. 1971); Ex parte Maki, 56 Cal. App. 2d 635, 133 P.2d 64 (1943). See Annot.,
51 A.L.R.3d 936 (1973).
32. See, e.g., Connell v. State, 371 S.W.2d 45 (Tex. Crim. 1963); Patterson v. City of
Dallas, 355 S.W.2d 838 (Tex. Civ. App. 1962), appeal dismissed, 372 U.S. 251 (1963).
33. See, e.g., Hogge v. Hedrick, 391 F. Supp. 91 (E.D. Va. 1975); Geisha House, Inc. v.
Wilson, 43 U.S.L.W. 2152 (D.C. Sup. Ct. Sept. 25, 1974).
34. Cianciolo v. Members of City Council, 376 F. Supp. 719 (E.D. Tenn. 1974); Corey v.
City of Dallas, 352 F. Supp. 977 (N.D. Tex. 1972), rev'd, 492 F.2d 496 (5th Cir. 1974).
35. This trend is evidenced in part by code revisions in some states. For example, Connecti-
cut's revised code states that it is based on the principle that non-commercial, private sexual
acts between consenting adults are not the concern of the criminal law. CONN. GEN. STAT.
ANN. § 532-65 et seq. (1971). See also ILL. ANN. STAT., ch.38, § 11 (Smith-Hurd 1972); N.Y.
PENAL LAW, art.130 (McKinney 1967); ORE. REV. STAT., chs.163, 167 (1971). The ALl Model
Code specifically exempts private consensual homosexual acts from criminal prohibition. ALl
MODEL PENAL CODE § 213.2 (Proposed Official Draft 1962). The Model Code also no longer
purports to reach every engagement in sexual activity for hire. Id. § 251.3.
36. Prostitution is itself a vast subject and can only be glossed over here. In general, it
involves many of the same constitutional issues arising in the massage parlor context. For
example, prostitution laws directed explicitly at the female prostitute or enforced almost
solely against her raise equal protection issues. In addition, many of the statutes applied
1976]
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ing consenting adults from engaging in commercialized sex should be ex-
amined.37 The basic issue is whether laws which embody certain concep-
tions of sexual morality retain their validity.
3 8
against prostitutes are archaic, overbroad loitering and vagrancy statutes which may often
violate due process. These issues are discussed in Haft, Hustling for Rights, 1 Civ. LIB. REV.
8 (Winter/Spring 1974); Pariente & Rosenbleet, The Prostitution of the Criminal Law, 11
AMER. CRIM. L. REV. 373 (1973). Both articles represent the view that prostitution laws form
an outdated system of regulations based on misconceptions and moralisms, which are admin-
istered without any sense of valid purpose and too often without any regard for basic individ-
ual rights.
37. It seems reasonable, as a starting point, to maintain that in the area of laws regulating
sexual conduct, the state has a valid interest in (1) protecting individuals from forcible
attack, (2) protecting those who are young, immature or incompetent from the sexual ad-
vances of the more mature who seek to exploit the youth, ignorance or incompetence of their
victims, and (3) protecting the public in general from conduct that openly flouts accepted
standards of morality or disturbs the peace. See Note, Victimless Sex Crimes: To the Devil,
Not the Dungeon, 25 U. FLA. L. REV. 139, 147-48 (1972). Taking these three interests as the
core of the state's interest in regulating sexual conduct, the issue becomes one of how far
beyond that core, if at all, the state's interest should extend. It should be noted that private,
consensual sexual acts between adults fall outside that core regardless of whether they take
place within the context of a commercial transaction.
Arguments for expanding the sphere of state interest beyond the core of interests described
should take account not only of generally accepted moral precepts but also of the social costs
incurred by enforcing laws prohibiting private, consensual sexual acts. It should be recognized
that such laws are subject to abuse and can be used by both public officials and private
persons as a means of blackmail. Moreover, changes in moral attitudes have legitimized
practices which unrepealed, dated laws render criminal. See 25 U. FLA. L. REV. at 148-53.
Finally, assuming the enforcement option is taken, it still remains to ascertain whether there
is any utility to exacting criminal penalties against persons who have willingly performed
proscribed acts. See Comment, Sexual Freedom for Consenting Adults- Why Not?, 2 PAC. L.J.
206, 223-24 (1971). Assertions of the right to regulate private sexual conduct which do not
consider these issues carefully suffer from a failure to treat the problem of moral regulations
with the necessary degree of comprehensiveness.
38. In a related context, obscenity, Justice Brennan has repeatedly argued that in the
absence of distribution to juveniles or obstrusive exposure to unconsenting adults, the state
and federal governments are prohibited by the first and fourteenth amendments from at-
tempting wholly to suppress sexually oriented materials on the basis of their allegedly obscene
contents. Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49 (1973) (Brennan, J.. dissenting). See
also Friedman v. United States, 421 U.S. 1004, 1005 (1975) (Brennan, J., dissenting); Athe-
neum Book Store, Inc. v. City of Miami Beach, 420 U.S. 982 (1975) (Brennan, J., dissenting);
McKinney v. City of Birmingham, 420 U.S. 950 (1975) (Brennan J., dissenting). A similar
argument can be made with respect to the state's attempt to regulate private adult sexual
activity. Namely, that except where sexual activity between consenting adults is displayed
to others against their will or where minors are involved, the right of privacy prohibits the
state's intrusion into matters which are properly left to individual conscience.
For a discussion of a philosophy of privacy which strikes a balance between state interests
and individual rights to privacy, see Doss, Jr. & Doss, On Morals, Privacy and the
Constitution, 25 U. MIAMI L. REV. 395, 396-400 (1971). Various articles assert that the right
to privacy protects specific kinds of sexual activity. See, e.g., Note, The Constitutionality of
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A survey of the case law demonstrates that, while the existence of a
constitutionally protected right to privacy is not questioned,3 the zones of
activity protected by that right remain largely uncharted. However, one
area of privacy which has been well defined is that covering a certain range
of individual choices concerning marriage and child rearing. Thus, the
right to privacy has been held to protect the freedom to choose to marry,10
the right to procreate," the right to make choices regarding the custody,
care and nurture of one's children, 42 and the right to educate and rear one's
children as one desires.13 These decisions paved the way for others bearing
more directly on the issue of sexual privacy.
The breakthrough was the holding in Griswold v. Connecticut4 4 that the
right to marital privacy precluded the state's interference with a couple's
decision to practice contraception. The Griswold ruling was extended to
encompass single individuals in Eisenstadt v. Baird.5 Subsequently, in
Roe v. Wade46 the Supreme Court ruled that within certain limits, a
woman's decision to have an abortion was a private matter beyond the
stat6's sphere of interest. A unifying principle implicit in all these decisions
was the recognition that certain individual choices directly related to
personal sexual practices fall within a protected area of privacy.
The Supreme Court has also made less direct statements which appear
to expand upon concepts of sexual privacy. For example, the Court's hold-
ing that a state cannot deny welfare payments to a family whose mother
is living with a man not her husband47 can be seen as supporting the
position that moral judgments as to the propriety of cohabitation cannot
Laws Forbidding Private Homosexual Conduct, 72 MIcH. L. REV. 1613 (1974); Comment, Oral
Copulation: A Constitutional Curtain Must Be Drawn, 11 SAN DIEGo L. REv. 523 (1974).
39. In Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 656 (1961), the Court spoke of a "right to privacy, no
less important than any other right carefully and particularly reserved to the people ......
See also Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152-56 (1973), and cases cited therein.
40. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
41. Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942).
42. Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944).
43. Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390
(1923).
44. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
45. 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
46. 410 U.S. 113 (1973). See also Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 209-15 (1973) (Douglas, J.,
concurring).
47. King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309 (1968). See also United States Dep't of Agric. v. Moreno,
413 U.S. 528, 535 n.7 (1973), in which the Court notes with approval the lower court's rejection
of the Department's contention that the denial of food stamps to households containing an
individual unrelated to any other member of the household was justified since it discouraged
cohabitation and communal living. The lower court had seen this as an invasion of the right
to privacy.
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support the state's decision to deny a person benefits to which he is other-
wise entitled. Similarly, the line of decisions" holding that illegitimate
children are not to be denied benefits or entitlements available to legiti-
mate children solely because of the status of their birth implies that the
circumstances of a person's birth, and all the moral connotations they may
invoke, should be of no concern to the state.
In light of Griswold and it progeny, and of the cases involving denials of
benefits or entitlements, it seems the Supreme Court is willing to go be-
yond the bounds of the marital relationships to protect rights of privacy
for less conventional relationships." At the very least, the Court has dem-
onstrated its sensitivity for the rights of those discriminated against by the
state simply because some aspect of their sexual lifestyle differs from the
norm or because moral judgments have been rendered against their par-
ents.
However, despite some evidence of a liberalizing trend, the Court may
not be prepared to go much further in expanding rights to sexual privacy.
In a zoning case," the Court refused to consider whether a restriction which
effectively prohibited six unmarried students of both sexes from renting a
house interfered with their right to privacy and upheld the ordinance as a
valid exercise of the police power. Moreover, in overturning a Florida stat-
ute against interracial cohabitation on equal protection grounds, the Court
did not question the validity of a generalized state purpose to prohibit
premarital and extramarital promiscuity. "' Finally, recent obscenity
48. Jimenez v. Weinberger, 417 U.S. 628 (1974); Weber v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 406 U.S.
164 (1972); Labine v. Vincent, 401 U.S. 532 (1971); Glona v. American Guar. & Liab. Ins.
Co., 391 U.S. 73 (1968); Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68 (1968).
49. Lower courts have been willing to go much further in extending the right to privacy to
various kinds of sexual conduct. See Cotner v. Henry, 394 F.2d 873 (7th Cir.), cert. denied,
393 U.S. 847 (1968) (sodomy between husband and wife); Lovisi v. Slayton, 363 F. Supp. 620
(E.D. Va. 1973). See also Acanfora v. Board of Educ., 359 F. Supp. 843 (D. Md. 1973)
(homosexuality), aff'd on other grounds, 491 F.2d 498 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 836
(1974). One decision has gone so far as to hold that fornication, adultery, sodomy and similar
consensual behavior by adults ate within protected zones of privacy and there is no compel-
ling state interest to warrant their criminalization. See United States v. Moses, 41 U.S.L.W.
2298 (D.C. Super. Ct. Nov. 3, 1972).
50. Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1 (1974). The challenged ordinance defined
a family as containing no more than two unrelated persons maintaining a common household
and excluded all groups of more than two unrelated persons from living in an area zoned for
single family dwellings. Justice Marshall dissented on grounds that the restrictions interfered
with the right to privacy. Id. at 13. Justice Douglas wrote for the majority. While the opinion
may have been influenced by a special sensitivity for zoning problems and their environmen-
tal implications, the fact that the most assertive of the justices with regard to fundamental
rights wrote it is significant.
51. McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 193, 196 (1964).
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decisions 2 make it clear that regardless of the right to sexual privacy which
protects married couples within their homes, public accommodations are
not covered by any doctrine of constitutional privacy. The day for the
inclusion of private acts of commercial sex between consenting adults
within constitutionally recognized zones of privacy has not yet arrived.
B. EQUAL PROTECTION
1. Levels of Scrutiny
The role of a court engaged in equal protection analysis has been de-
scribed as that of a balancer expected to safeguard constitutional values
while at the same time maintaining proper respect for the legislature as a
coordinate branch of government.0 Specifically, a court addresses the
question of whether a particular classification or differentiation embodied
in a statute is an arbitrary and therefore invidious discrimination54 which
will not be allowed to stand. Traditional equal protection analysis has
carried out this evaluation within the context of a two tiered model" that
allows the court to function as the champion of both legislative preroga-
tives and constitutionally-protected interests. Thus, applying the mini-
mum rationality" standard on one level, the court emphasizes the main-
tenance of proper respect for the legislature and pays it a great deal of
deference. On the second level, the court adopts a strict scrutiny57 standard
and emphasizes its role as the guardian of constitutional values.
Under traditional minimum scrutiny, the party seeking to invalidate a
statutory classification bears the burden of establishing that it is arbitrary
52. Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49 (1973). In language easily transferred to
the massage parlor context, the Court stated that the exhibition of obscene material in places
of public accommodation is not protected by any constitutional doctrine of privacy. A com-
mercial theatre cannot be equated with a private home. Id. at 66-67. The Court also declared
that not all conduct directly involving consenting adults has a claim to constitutional protec-
tion. Id. at 68-69. See also United States v. Orito, 413 U.S. 139 (1973); United States v.
Twelve 200 Ft. Reels of Film, 413 U.S. 123 (1973). The rationale of these cases was followed
in upholding the conviction of an operator of a health club frequented by homosexuals for
"keeping a disorderly house." See Harris v. United States, 315 A.2d 569 (D.C. Ct. App. 1974).
53. Developments in the Law-Equal Protection, 82 HARV. L. REV. 1065, 1078 (1969)
[hereinafter cited as Developments].
54. "But the classification must be reasonable, not arbitrary, and must rest upon some
ground of difference having a fair and substantial relation to the object of the legislation, so
that all persons similarly circumstanced shall be treated alike." F. S. Royster Guano Co. v.
Virginia, 253 U.S. 412, 415 (1920). See Tussman & tenBroek, The Equal Protection of the
Laws, 37 CAUF. L. REv. 341 (1949).
55. For a discussion of the two tiered model, see Developments, supra note 53, at 1077-132.
56. This will be discussed more fully. See notes 58-62 infra and accompanying text.
57. See notes 63-73 infra and accompanying text.
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and unreasonable.', The challenger must overcome the presumption of
statutory validity by proving the classification bears no fair and substan-
tial relationship to the express or implied purpose which prompted its
legislative enactment. 9 The court's task is to determine whether the stat-
ute is aimed at the achievement of a constitutionally-permissible purpose
and whether the classification is an arbitrary means of effectuating that
purpose." The deferential nature of minimum rationality analysis has been
demonstrated by the fact that its adoption has amounted to a virtual
abandonment of review of equal protection questions." Moreover, this ab-
dication has been supplemented by reasoning which allows apparently
arbitrary classifications to stand on the theory that the legislature cannot
always address a problem all at once and should therefore be allowed to
address it piecemeal. 2
By contrast, the strict scrutiny standard reverses the presumption of
statutory validity characteristic of minimum rationality and casts the bur-
den of proving that a statute is reasonable and not arbitrary on the state.1
3
Strict scrutiny is triggered by statutory classifications which have been
categorized as suspect or by those classifications adversely affecting funda-
mental interests. 4 The judicially established suspect classifications are
58. "One who assails the classification ... must carry the burden of showing it does not
rest upon any reasonable basis, but is essentially arbitrary." Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic
Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61, 78-79 (1911).
59. F. S. Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia, 253 U.S. 412, 415 (1920).
60. See Developments, supra note 53, at 1077-87.
61. Id. at 1087. The nearly limitless scope of discretion accorded state legislatures is
illustrated by the majority opinion in McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 425-26 (1961):
The constitutional safeguard is offended only if the classification rests on grounds
wholly irrelevant to the achievement of the State's objective .... A statutory discrim-
ination will not be set aside if any state of facts reasonably may be conceived to justify
it.
This statement was no more, albeit in very explicit terms, than the reaffirmation of long-
standing Court practice. Thus, some twelve year earlier in Goesaert v. Cleary, 335 U.S. 464
(1948), the Court sustained a statute prohibiting all women not the wives or daughters of male
bar owners from employment as bartenders. Rather than regarding the statute as a measure
designed to protect a virtually all male job market from female competition, the Court
conceived the legislative purpose as the control of moral and social problems stemming from
the employment of women in bars. Id. at 465, 467. See also McDonald v. Board of Election
Comm'rs., 394 U.S. 802 (1969).
62. This was the rationale behind the holding in Railway Express Agency, Inc. v. New
York, 336 U.S. 106, 110 (1949), that authorities seeking to remove distractions posing hazards
to traffic could reasonably ban the sale of advertising space on the side panels of the com-
plainant's trucks while allowing other trucks to advertise the owner's products without deny-
ing equal protection to Railway Express. See also Central Lumber Co. v. South Dakota, 226
U.S. 157, 160 (1912).
63. See Developments, supra note 53, at 1101, 1132-33.
64. Id. at 1124-30.
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race," national origin 6 and alienage.6 7 Judicially recognized fundamental
interests include the right to vote,66 to travel,6 9 to procreate 7  and the
criminal defendant's right to certain procedural safeguards. 7' A statute
subject to strict scrutiny will survive only if the state can demonstrate that
the statute furthers a compelling state interest and that it employs the
least drastic means available to effectuate the legislative purpose.72 The
rigorousness of this standard is manifested by the fact that a court's deci-
sion to adopt it is often tantamount to a predetermination to strike down
a statute.
73
Discontent with the rigid strict scrutiny-minimum rationality dichot-
omy of traditional equal protection analysis has produced suggestions fa-
voring development of alternate standards. 74 Moreover, comparison be-
tween the Warren Court and Burger Court approaches to equal protection
evidences that a modification of doctrine leading to the creation of an
intermediate level of scrutiny is in fact underway.7 5 This evolving standard
may be described as a more rigorous form of minimum rationality7 which
65. See, e.g., Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967); McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184
(1964).
66. See, e.g., Oyama v. California, 332 U.S. 633 (1948).
67. See. e.g., Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971).
68. See, e.g., Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
69. See, e.g., Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
70. See Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942).
71. See Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963); Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956).
For a more recent statement of the Court's position on this issue, see Blackledge v. Perry,
417 U.S. 21 (1974).
72. See Note, The Less Restrictive Alternative in Constitutional Adjudication: An Analy-
sis, A Justification and Some Criteria, 27 VAND. L. REv. 971 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Less
Restrictive Alternative]. Strict scrutiny has also been described as a three pronged standard
in which the state must show that "(1) the means. . . are necessary, (2) to further a compel-
ling interest, (3) aimed at a legitimate goal." Id. at 997. The rationale behind this particular
breakdown is the observation that the Court has in various instances gone beyond the exami-
nation of alternative means and extended its inquiry into the question of whether there is
any need at all for the classification. See id. at 999-1000 and cases cited therein.
73. Id. at 997 n.168. See also, Note, A Question of Balance: Statutory Classifications Under
the Equal Protection Clause, 26 STAN. L. REv. 155, 156 (1973).
74. See, e.g., Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 520-21 (1970) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
Justice Marshall, a leading proponent of a change in equal protection analysis, seeks to
replace two mutually exclusive standards with a process that balances the character of the
classification, the relative importance to individuals in the class of benefits or interests denied
them, and the asserted state interests.
75. See, Gunther, The Supreme Court 1971 Term-Foreword: In Search of Evolving Doc-
trine on a Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. REv. 1, 19-24
(1972) [hereinafter cited as 1971 Term-Foreword].
76. Id. at 21. Since this intermediate level of analysis is an intensified form of minimum
rationality, the compelling state interest component which operates where strict scrutiny is
applied does not come into play here.
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demands that the state produce empirical evidence supporting the reason-
ableness of a classification rather than merely supplying a conceivable
rational relationship between the classification and the statutory pur-
pose.77
2. Intermediate Scrutiny and the Sex Classification Problem
The Supreme Court has given no clear indication where intermediate
equal protection analysis will be utilized, 8 but one area of application has
been that of sex discrimination," an issue which has until recently main-
tained its viability as the basis for challenges to massage parlor regula-
tions."' This represents a departure from traditional approaches to sex-
based classifications,"' but an important one in light of the Supreme
77. An example of this approach is Humphrey v. Cady, 405 U.S. 504 (1972), where the
equal protection challenge to a statutory scheme which required jury determinations prior to
pretrial commitments under a mental health statute but not for those carried out under a
sex crimes statute was found persuasive enough to warrant an evidentiary hearing on remand.
See Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715 (1972), where differing provisions for pretrial
commitment of criminal defendants and the commitment of persons not charged with an
offense were held to violate equal protection. In both cases, the Court used the terminology
of traditional minimum rationality but in the absence of evidence in support of the state's
classifications declined to defer to the legislature.
78. Gunther makes the point that intermediate equal protection analysis allows the Court
to decide controversial issues without squarely confronting them. 1971 Term-Foreword,
supra note 75, at 29-36. Thus, in Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972), the Court avoided
a direct ruling that the right to privacy protected unmarried couples who decided to practice
contraception but, nevertheless, established that right by holding that there was no rational
basis for the state's interference with a couple's personal decision.
79. See, Comment, The Supreme Court 1974 Term and Sex-Based Classifications: Avoid-
ing a Standard of Review, 19 ST. Louis U.L.J. 375 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Sex-Based
Classifications].
80. See, e.g., Annot. 53 A.L.R.3d 936 (1973) and cases cited therein. The viability of an
equal protection challenge to ordinances which prohibit opposite sex massages has been
severely crippled, if not eliminated, by the application of the holding in Hicks v. Miranda,
422 U.S. 332 (1975). Dismissal of an appeal for want of a substantial federal question consti-
tutes a judgment upon the merits which is binding upon the lower federal courts. In three
instances, the Supreme Court has dismissed equal protection challenges to opposite sex
massage ordinances on that ground. Smith v. Keator, 419 U.S. 1043 (1974); Rubenstein v.
Township of Cherry Hill, 417 U.S. 963 (1974); Kisley v. City of Falls Church, 409 U.S. 907
(1972). These developments have led to the holding in Hogge v. Johnson, 526 F.2d 833 (4th
Cir. 1975), that all equal protection challenges to opposite sex massage ordinances are now
precluded from the federal courts. See also Aldred v. Duling, Civil No. 76-0002-R (E.D. Va.
January 15, 1976). See notes 129-139 and accompanying text infra.
81. For example, in Bradwell v. State [of Illinois], 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 130 (1872), the Court
upheld Illinois' denial of a license to practice law to a woman. The Court referred to the
"natural and proper timidity and delicacy which belongs to the female sex. ... Id. at 141
(Bradley, J., concurring). See Johnston & Knapp, Sex Discrimination by Law: A Study in
Judicial Perspective, 46 N.Y.U.L. REV. 675 (1971).
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Court's refusal to declare sex a suspect classification. 2 A case in point is
Reed v. Reed,, which overturned a provision in the Idaho probate code
giving automatic preference to men over women when persons of the same
entitlement class applied for appointment as administrator of a decedent's
estate. Without holding that sex was a suspect classification, the Court did
state that the statutory classification at issue was "subject to scrutiny." 8
The clear implication was that sex classifications would not receive the
deference characteristic of minimum rationality.
Unfortunately, more recent decisions have not served to establish any
consistent pattern of equal protection analysis in sex discrimination
cases."5 Some cases were not decided on equal protection grounds." Others
have countenanced benign sex classifications which discriminate in favor
of women on the ground that they remedied the effects of past discrimina-
tion." Finally, in one extraordinary instance, the Court managed to con-
clude that provisions of a state insurance code which excluded work-loss
due to a normal pregnancy from disability insurance coverage did not
involve sex classifications at all and applied the minimum rationality stan-
dard. 8  Nevertheless, despite these inconsistencies, sex discrimination
cases do illustrate the evolution of equal protection analysis from the rigid
pattern of the Warren Court era.89
82. In Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973), a plurality of four justices (Brennan,
Douglas, Marshall, and White) asserted that sex was a suspect classification. Id. at 688.
However, a majority of the Court has not so held, and subsequent decisions seem to indicate
that the Court is intent on backing away from Frontiero. See, e.g., Stanton v. Stanton, 421
U.S. 7, 13 (1975). See also notes 85-88 infra and accompanying text.
83. 404 U.S. 71 (1971). The reasoning used in Reed was cited as controlling in Stanton v.
Stanton, 421 U.S. 7 (1975).
84. 404 U.S. at 75.
85. Sex-Based Classifications, supra note 79, at 381-94.
86. See, e.g., Turner v. Dep't of Employment Sec., 422 U.S. 44 (1975) (per curiam); Cleve-
land Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632 (1974).
87. See Schlesinger v. Ballard, 419 U.S. 498 (1975); Kahn v. Shevin, 416 U.S. 351 (1974).
On benign classifications see G. GUNTHER & N. DOWLNG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: CASES AND
MATERIALS 1416-19 (8th ed. 1970) [hereinafter cited as G. GUNTHER & N. DOWLING]. See also
DeFunis v. Odegaard, 416 U.S. 312 (1974) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
88. See Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484 (1974). But cf. Turner v. Dep't of Employment
Sec., 422 U.S. 44 (1975).
89. The evolution of equal protection analysis has also been manifested in the Court's
unwillingness to extend the scope of strict scrutiny by refusing to declare new fundamental
interests or new suspect classifications. See, e.g., San Antonio Independent School Dist. v.
Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973) (wealth not a suspect classification, education not a fundamen-
tal interest); Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970) (welfare payments not a fundamen-
tal interest).
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C. SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS
Oftentimes, the overlap between substantive due process analysis and
equal protection analysis is such that there is little reason other than
categorical nicety for separating the two.9" However, the due process clause
has served a special and unique function as a repository of constitutional
values which have supported a broad spectrum of limitations upon govern-
mental policies of conduct regulation and enforcement.9 Under due pro-
cess analysis the judiciary's role is to review the alignment between legisla-
tive purpose and recognized values, the implementation of that purpose by
the regulatory method and the efficacy of alternative methods.2 In its
simplest terms, due process analysis is designed to ascertain whether a
plausible argument can be made that a given legislative act furthers a
permissible governmental goal without imposing excessive restrictions
upon individual freedoms.
1. Economic-Substantive Due Process
The most controversial development in the history of due process analy-
sis has been the now largely discredited policy of judicial interventionism
in socio-economic affairs which has been termed economic-substantive due
process.9 3 The chief rationale behind this policy was a marked antipathy
towards legislation which conflicted with laissez faire economic theory on
grounds that such legislation impinged upon some vague concept of liberty
or property protected by the due process clause.94
90. See Developments, supra note 53, at 1132; Less Restrictive Alternative, supra note 72,
at 981. See notes 102-08 infra and accompanying text.
91. Ratner, The Function of the Due Process Clause, 116 U. PA. L. REV. 1048, 1049 (1968).
92. Id. at 1050. See generally G. GUNTHER & N. DOWLING, supra note 87, at 954-82.
93. See Ely, The Wages of Crying Wolf: A Comment on Roe v. Wade, 82 YALE L.J. 920,
940-41 (1973); McCloskey, Economic Due Process and the Supreme Court.An Exhumation
and Reburial, 1962 S. CT. REV. 34.
94. See G. GUNTHER & N. DOWLING, supra note 87, at 954-67; Less Restrictive Alternative,
supra note 72, at 974-76. In Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905), the Supreme Court
invalidated a maximum working hours law as an excessive interference with an individual's
liberty to work as he pleased. In Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U.S. 1 (1915), the Court invalidated
legislation directed against exclusionary "yellow dog" contracts on grounds that the law
interfered with liberty of contract. In addition to Lochner and Coppage, the most notorious
economic-substantive due process cases are Adair v. United States, 208 U.S. 161 (1908), and
Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U.S. 578 (1897). See Lincoln Fed. Labor Union v. Northwestern
Iron & Metal Co., 335 U.S. 525 (1949).
The obvious inference was that the Court was seeking to impose its own social views on
state legislatures, and this led Justice Holmes to warn his brethren that: "The Fourteenth
Amendment does not enact Mr. Herbert Spencer's Social Statistics." Lochner v. New York,
198 U.S. 45, 74 (1905) (Holmes, J., dissenting). As the Court continued to hand down incon-
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The economic-substantive due process line came to an end during the
New Deal in a series of decisions which upheld far-reaching economic
legislation while simultaneously overruling earlier decisions. 95 Where the
Court had been activist it now became deferential to the point of abdica-
tion. As the Court itself stated in Williamson v. Lee Optical Co.,9" the day
had passed when it would use the due process clause to strike down laws
regulating business and industrial conditions because they might be un-
wise, improvident or out of harmony with a particular school of thought.
Finally, in Ferguson v. Skrupa,97 the Court delivered the coup de grace to
economic-substantive due process and ruled that, absent a conflict with
some specific constitutional provision or some valid federal law, a state has
vast power to legislate against injurious practices in its internal commer-
cial and business affairs.
2. Substantive Due Process and Individual Liberties
But, if economic-substantive due process has been severely denigrated,
the due process clause has been given renewed life in the area of civil
liberties and individual rights."' The leading case in this area is Griswold
v. Connecticut,99 where Mr. Justice Douglas stated that the Court's hold-
ing derived its authority from the right to privacy implicit in the Bill of
Rights. This was accompanied by other opinions in which five concurring
justices and two dissenters chose to view the decision as at least partially
based on the due process clause.' 0 The abortion cases of 1973 dispelled any
remaining doubts as to the revival of substantive due process."'
sistent decisions based on obscure distinctions, the suspicion grew that the only unifying
principles behind economic-substantive due process were judicial prejudices. See cases cited
and compared in Less Restrictive Alternative, supra note 72, at 976 n.24, 978 n.36.
95. See, e.g., Olsen v. Nebraska, 313 U.S. 236 (1941), overruling Ribnik v. McBride, 277
U.S. 350 (1928); West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937), overruling Adkins v.
Children's Hosp., 261 U.S. 525 (1923). See generally G. GUNTHER & N. DOWLING, supra note
87, at 962-82.
96. 348 U.S. 483, 488 (1955).
97. 372 U.S. 726, 730-31 (1973), quoting Lincoln Fed. Labor Union v. Northwestern Iron &
Metal Co., 335 U.S. 525, 536 (1949). Ferguson was reaffirmed in North Dakota State Bd. of
Pharm. v. Snyder's Drug Stores, Inc., 414 U.S. 156 (1973).
98. See Ely, supra note 93; Ratner, supra note 91; Tribe, The Supreme Court 1972 Term-
Foreword: Toward a Model of Roles in the Due Process of Life and Law, 87 HARv. L. REV. 1
(1973) [hereinafter cited as 1972 Term-Foreword].
99. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
100. Id. at 486-99 (Goldberg, J., concurring, joined by Warren, C.J., and Brennan, J.); id.
at 499-502 (Harlan, J., concurring); id. at 502-07 (White, J., concurring); id. at 507-27 (Black,
J., dissenting, joined by Stewart, J.); id. at 527-31 (Stewart, J., dissenting, joined by Black,
J.).
101. Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179 (1973); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). In Roe, the
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The standard used in due process cases involving civil and individual
rights has been similar to or virtually identical with that used under strict
scrutiny in equal protection cases. 10 Thus, in Griswold, the Court applied
what amounted to a least drastic means"3 approach when it reasoned that
enforcement of a ban on the use of contraceptives entailed invasions of
marital privacy which were at best superfluous in view of the state's power
to regulate their sale and manufacture."' In Roe v. Wade,"5 the Court
paralleled the compelling interest test' 0 of equal protection by holding
that, prior to fetal viability, the state's interest in protecting potential life
did not outweigh a woman's protected privacy rights. 107 In effect, substan-
tive due process can be regarded as a means of subjecting statutes which
interfere with fundamental rights not explicitly mentioned in the Constitu-
tion to a form of strict scrutiny closely paralleling that employed in equal
protection cases.' 0
In general, regulations will invoke due process review whenever they are
overbroadly drawn so as to conflict with individual interests in the exercise
of certain recognized rights. One locus for such conflict which bears partic-
ular relevance to the problem of massage parlor regulations is the area of
competition between the state's interest in regulating commercial affairs
in order to protect public health, safety and welfare and the individual's
Court held that Texas' criminal abortion statute was invalid because it violated a woman's
right to privacy which was protected by the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment.
In Doe, the Court ruled that procedural conditions precedent to obtaining an abortion in
Georgia interfered excessively with the qualified right to an abortion. For a discussion of Roe
see Ely, supra note 93; 1972 Term-Foreword, supra note 98, at 10-41.
102. In his Roe dissent, Justice Rehnquist objected to the importation of strict equal
protection standards into due process. 410 U.S. at 173. Ely, supra note 93, sees this mixing
of equal protection and due process analysis as the most troublesome aspect of Roe because
the effect is to require that the state interest be of compelling or strict importance, and this
tips the balancing process applied in due process analysis to one side. He contrasts this with
economic-substantive due process which, for all its faults, did not go beyond a requirement
of a rational relationship to a statutory purpose. Id. at 941-43.
103. See note 72 supra.
104. 381 U.S. at 485. Justice Goldberg echoed this reasoning by stating that the state
interest " . . . can be served by a more discriminately tailored statute, which does not...
[intrudel upon the privacy of all married couples." Id. at 498.
105. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
106. See note 72 supra.
107. 410 U.S. at 152-56.
108. A good example of a due process case which parallels equal protection analysis is
Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973), where it was held that sex-based distinctions
justified on the basis of administrative convenience could not be supported merely on those
grounds and therefore violated the due process clause. Cf. Schlesinger v. Ballard, 419 U.S.
498 (1975), where a sex-based classification justified as a remedial measure to correct the
results of sex discrimination was held to not violate due process.
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interest in his right to conduct a legitimate business or to pursue a legiti-
mate occupation.' 9 But the success of a challenge to regulations on
grounds that they violate occupational rights"' protected by the due
process clause depends on whether the asserted rights are deemed funda-
mental."' The authority directly supporting that proposition is a product
of the era of economic-substantive due process and is, therefore, of ques-
tionable value."' Moreover, the assertions of certain commentators" 3 that
the dichotomy between civil rights and economic rights should be elimi-
nated is not supported by convincing authority."' Consequently, without
109. See notes 93-97 supra and accompanying text.
110. The term occupational rights is used here generally to denote both the right to conduct
a legitimate business and the right to pursue a chosen line of work.
111. See notes 102-07 supra and accompanying text.
112. New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262 (1932); Terrace v. Thompson, 263 U.S.
197 (1923); Trfax v. Raich, 239 U.S. 33 (1915).
113. See 1971 Term-Foreword, supra note 75, at 37-48; McCloskey, supra note 93, at 45-
50; 1972 Term-Foreword, supra note 98, at 9. In general the argument is that the distinction
between individual liberties and personal economic rights may reflect judicial tastes and
academic preferences rather than any truly substantive or qualitative distinction between
them. McCloskey, supra note 93, at 48. It has also been pointed out that an increasing
proportion of wealth takes the form of rights and status, a prime example being one's occupa-
tion and the status which attaches to it. Reich, The New Property, 73 YALE L.J. 733, 738
(1964).
114. A recent statement of judicial dissatisfaction with a rigid civil rights-property rights
dichotomy is contained in dictum in Lynch v. Household Finance Corp., 405 U.S. 538, 552
(1972), to the effect that the distinction is false. A direct assertion that the right to work is a
fundamental right is made in Justice Douglas' dissent in Barsky v. Board of Regents, 347 U.S.
442, 472 (1954).
Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134 (1974), which dealt with a dismissed OEO employee's
assertion that, absent a full adversary hearing before removal, he could not, consistent with
due process requirements, be divested of his property interest or expectancy in employment.
But a divided Court had little to say about the right to work. The plurality (Rehnquist, Burger
and Stewart) held that the employee's substantive right to work was a statutory creation
subject to statutory limitations. Id. at 153-54. Mr. Justice Powell (joined by Blackmun, J.,
concurring in part and concurring in result in part) argued that even though Congress had
originally conferred a substantive right, it could not now take it away without providing
appropriate procedural safeguards. Id. at 164. Mr. Justice White (concurring in part, dissent-
ing in part) argued that a property right created by Congress was no different than one origi-
nating in the private sector and implied that property rights enjoyed a special degree of pro-
tection. Id. at 180-81. Justices Douglas and Marshall (joined by Brennan, J.) dissented. The
former based his dissent on the first amendment. Id. at 203. Mr. Justice Marshall displayed
some sympathy for occupational rights and for the plight of those deprived of work, but this
was not the basis of his dissent. Id. at 221.
In another context, the Supreme Court has held that persons cannot be deprived of prop-
erty interests on the basis of summary proceedings permitting a private party to repossess
property without a notification or prior hearing for the party affected. The rationale behind
these decisions was the Court's refusal to differentiate between different kinds of property
interests on the basis of whether or not some were more deserving of protection than others.
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clear-cut evidence of a shift away from hostility to economic-substantive
due process, a challenge to regulations based on a theory of fundamental
occupational rights appears unlikely to succeed.
D. CONCLUSIVE PRESUMPTIONS
A more promising avenue for the parlor operator who believes himself
victimized by regulations directed at controlling illegitimate operators
may be a challenge to regulations on the theory they embody a conclusive
or irrebutable presumption"5 that all massage parlors harbor illicit activi-
ties. Statutes scrutinized on this basis are subjected to a hybrid process of
analysis which combines elements of both procedural and substantive due
process and equal protection."6 The concern in conclusive presumption
cases is less with the overall accuracy of a legislative classification than
with the treatment of particular individuals affected by it. The remedy
provided is not the outright invalidation of a classification, but a require-
ment that an individual affected by it be given an opportunity to challenge
its application to him."' Statutory presumptions will be held constitu-
tional as long as the inference of the presumed fact from the proof of
another is rational and not so unreasonable as to be purely arbitrary, and
so long as a party enjoys the right to present a defense to the presumed
fact."6
See North Georgia Finishing, Inc. v. Di-Chem, Inc., 419 U.S. 601 (1975); Fuentes v. Shevin,
407 U.S. 67 (1972). See also Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975). But see Mitchell v. W. T.
Grant Co., 416 U.S. 600 (1974). These are rather slim threads upon which to support the
contention that the Supreme Court has put an end to the civil rights-property rights dichot-
omy.
115. See Note, Irrebutable Presumptions as an Alternative to Strict Scrutiny: From Rodri-
guez to LaFleur, 62 GEo. L.J. 1173 (1974); Note, The Irrebutable Presumption Doctrine in
the Supreme Court, 87 HARV. L. REV. 1534 (1974) [hereinafter cited as The Irrebutable
Presumption Doctrine].
116. For a critical treatment of the conclusive presumption doctrine, see id. at 1544-56. See
also Note, Irrebutable Presumptions: An Illusory Analysis, 27 STAN. L. REV. 449 (1975); Note,
The Conclusive Presumption Doctrine: Equal Process or Due Protection?, 72 MICH. L. REV.
800 (1974).
117. The Irrebutable Presumption Doctrine, supra note 115, at 1547-48.
118. Mobile, Jackson & K. C. R.R. v. Turnipseed, 219 U.S. 35, 43 (1910). Conclusive
presumption is not a new doctrine. It was employed by activist judges during the era of
economic-substantive due process. See Hoeper v. Tax Comm'n, 284 U.S. 206 (1931); Schlesin-
ger v. Wisconsin, 270 U.S. 230 (1926). More recently the concept had been confined largely
to criminal cases. See United States v. Romano, 382 U.S. 136 (1965). The trend towards
applying conclusive presumption analysis to substantive due process cases involving civil
rights can be traced to Carrington v. Rash, 380 U.S. 89 (1965) (all migrant servicemen residing
in Texas while in the service could not be prohibited from voting). See also Stanley v. Illinois,
405 U.S. 645 (1972); Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535 (1971).
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These concepts are illustrated in Vlandis v. Kline,'9 which invalidated
a Connecticut statute governing residency requirements for in-state tu-
ition benefits at state universities. The law established that all students
not residents at the time of their application would not be granted in-
state residence at any time during the entire period of their attendance.
The Court held that the inference drawn from the fact of a student's non-
resident status at the time of application was neither rational nor consis-
tent with the state's goal of ensuring that only bona fide residents receive
tuition benefits.'20 In addition, those whom the statute presumed not to
have any intention to reside in Connecticut were given no opportunity to
demonstrate otherwise. 2' For these reasons, the Court concluded that the
statute constituted a denial of due process. 2 While recognizing the legiti-
macy of the state's goals, the Court rejected the use of means based on a
presumption "not necessarily or iimiversally true in fact,"1" a presumption
from which there was no appeal.
The conclusive presumption concept may be of great importance to the
employee or operator of a legitimate massage parlor adversely affected by
sweeping applications of regulations clearly designed to attack abuses by
those who use the business as a cover to traffic in commercialized sex.
While conceding the state's interest in safeguarding public morality, a
challenge to such regulations would seek judicial determination of whether
that interest justifies presumptions which form the basis for classifications
based on an easily identifiable trait (i.e., massage parlors employing mas-
seuses who cater to a virtually all-male clientele) that is related to, but not
necessarily tantamount to, the evil sought to be prevented (i.e., sexual
immorality). The role of the Court is to ascertain whether, in the light of
the availability of reasonable regulatory alternatives,2" and the existence
119. 412 U.S. 441 (1973).
120. Id. at 449-50. The Court also noted that a lifelong resident who attended undergradu-
ate school in another state and then applied for admission to graduate school in Connecticut
could be forced to pay out-of-state tuition even though his parents had continued to reside
in Connecticut. Id. at 450.
121. Id. at 448.
122. Id. at 450.
123. Id. at 452. Other recent conclusive presumption cases are Turner v. Department of
Employment Sec., 422 U.S. 44 (1975); Weinberger v. Salfi, 422 U.S. 749 (1975); Taylor v.
Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522 (1975). Taylor held that the systematic exclusion of women from jury
duty violated the requirement that juries be drawn from a representative cross-section of the
community. The Court conceded that a state could grant exemptions from jury service but
noted that the evidence "put to rest the suggestion that all women should be exempt from
jury service based solely on their sex and the presumed role in the home." 419 U.S. at 535
n.17.
124. If conclusive presumption analysis is to serve a worthwhile purpose as a delimited,
means-focused method of analysis, it should include provisions for the consideration of
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or non-existence of opportunities for those affected by a regulation to dem-
onstrate why they do not fit the presumptive model, those who possess the
trait but not the evil should suffer the same burden as those who possess
both. Finally, in granting its remedy, the Court can protect both sides of
the issue by recognizing a valid state interest but requiring that it be
implemented only by carefully tailored means in order to avoid undue
interference with individual interests.
IV. METHODS EMPLOYED IN REGULATION
A. PROHIBITION OF OPPOSITE SEX MASSAGE
In an attempt to erect a barrier against immoral acts likely to result from
intimate familiarity between the sexes, 25 many localities have enacted
ordinances with provisions prohibiting massage by members of the oppos-
ite sex in a commercial setting. 26 It is this most common provision which
alternate means. Without consideration of alternatives, conclusive presumption analysis be-
comes completely a matter of considering legislative ends and thereby becomes little more
than an exercise in substantive due process. The danger in this is that a conclusive presump-
tion would then have the effect of prohibiting all state action in a certain area rather than
acting to require that the state pursue concededly legitimate ends with more carefully tailored
means. See Less Restrictive Alternative, supra note 72, at 989 & n.113. In this respect it
should be noted that Weinberger v. Salfi, 422 U.S. 749 (1975), appears to represent an at-
tempt to avoid these dangers by restricting the applicability of conclusive presumptions and
does so by emphasizing the equal protection component in conclusive presumption analysis.
See Note, The Supreme Court 1974 Term, 89 HARv. L. REv. 47, 81-85 (1975).
125. 6 E. McQUILLIN, MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS § 24.112, at 687 (3d rev. ed. 1969).
126. See, e.g., FAu.S CHURCH VA., CODE ch. 19, § 19.11 (Ord. No. 512):
Massages or baths administered by person of opposite sex. It shall be unlawful for any
establishment, regardless of whether it is a public or private facility, to operate as a
massage salon, bath parlor or any similar type business where any physical contact
with the recipient of such services is provided by a person of the opposite sex. Any
person violating the provisions of this section, shall, upon conviction, be punished as
provided in this Code; and in addition to such penalty, it shall be the duty of the city
manager to revoke the license of the owner or manager of the establishment, wherein
the provisions of this section shall have been violated.
Typically such ordinances exclude from their coverage hospitals, nursing homes, medical
clinics and doctors' offices, barber shops and beauty parlors. Certain other ordinances that
have failed to include language such as "for hire" or "in commercial establishments" contain
almost comic implications, yet at least one court has stated that where such language is
absent, it would supply the construction necessary to fulfill the meaning of the ordinance.
Patterson v. City of Dallas, 355 S.W.2d 838 (Tex. Civ. App. 1962).
A restriction also common to many massage parlor ordinances is the prohibition of both
genital contact and exposure of genitals and breasts of females. One federal court has sug-
gested that this provision may be underinclusive in character since it prohibits conduct which
if performed elsewhere may be regarded as lawful; however, this finding was in the context
of a motion for preliminary injunction in which the court determined that the plaintiffs may
have succeeded on the merits on this issue. Hogge v. Hedrick, 391 F. Supp. 91, 100 (E.D. Va.
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massage parlor operators have repeatedly challenged in state and federal
courts.
1. Constitutional Challenges
Until recently, challenges to opposite sex provisions on equal protection
and due process grounds generally had been successful in the federal courts
and had met with defeat in the state courts. This resulted in decisions
which were unanimous in neither their reasoning nor their conclusions.2 7
The fourteenth amendment issue, however, appears to lack current vitality
as a result of the Supreme Court's dismissal of appeals in 1972 and 1974
of state supreme court decisions which rejected constitutional challenges
to prohibitive opposite sex massage ordinances,'28 and the Court's subse-
quent confirmation in Hicks v. Miranda'29 that its dismissal of an appeal
for want of a substantial federal question should be treated by the lower
courts as an adjudication on the merits of the case.13 Recent lower court
adherence to the Hicks directive suggests that localities may expect to
prevail in the face of constitutional challenges to local ordinances prohibit-
ing opposite sex massage.
1974). It may be reasonably argued that while genital contact and exposure is protected in a
private setting, the state may prohabit such conduct in a commercial establishment. In Lovisi
v. Slayton, 44 U.S.L.W. 2542 (4th Cir. 1976), the court held that the petitioners, by permit-
ting themselves to be photographed committing sodomidic acts, voluntarily relinquished any
rights to privacy that may have surrounded and protected their acts. In Wayside Restaurant,
Inc. v. City of Virginia Beach, 215 Va. 231, 208 S.E.2d 57 (1974), the Virginia Supreme Court
held, in a case involving a challenge to an ordinance prohibiting exposure of genital parts in
a restaurant, that where a line could be clearly drawn between commercial and non-
commercial conduct and the prohibited conduct was in the commercial area, the complainant
did not have standing to rely upon the hypothetical rights of those in the non-commercial
area in mounting an attack upon the constitutionality of a legislative enactment. Numerous
other state courts have upheld similar legislation. Seattle v. Marshall, 83 Wash. 2d 665, 521
P.2d 693 (1974); Yauch v. State, 109 Ariz. 576, 514 P.2d 709 (1973); Crownoner v. Musick,
107 Cal. Rptr. 681, 509 P.2d 497 (1973).
127. Colorado Springs Amusements, Ltd. v. Rizzo, 387 F. Supp. 690, 694 (E.D. Pa. 1974),
rev'd, 524 F.2d 571 (3d Cir. 1975).
128. Smith v. Keator, 419 U.S. 1043 (1974), dismissing appeal for want of a substantial
federal question, 285 N.C. 530, 206 S.E.2d 203 (1974); Rubenstein v. Twp. of Cherry Hill,
417 U.S. 963 (1974), dismissing appeal for want of a substantial federal question, No. 10,027
(N.J. Sup. Ct. Jan. 29, 1974); Kisley v. City of Falls Church, 409 U.S. 907, dismissing appeal
for want of a substantial federal question, 212 Va. 693, 187 S.E.2d 168 (1972).
129. 422 U.S. 332 (1975).
130. Id. at 2289. See also 13 WRIrr, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, ch. 2 § 3564 n.8
(1975), which suggested even before Hicks was decided that inferior courts should adhere to
the view that if the Supreme Court has branded a question insubstantial it remains so except
when doctrinal developments indicate otherwise.
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In Kisley v. City of Falls Church, ' 3' the Virginia Supreme Court quoted
extensively from the leading state case of Ex parte Maki' and rejected
massage parlor operators' arguments that an opposite sex massage ordi-
nance deprived them of property rights without due process of law and
denied them equal protection.'3 The Supreme Court's dismissal of an ap-
131. 212 Va. 693, 187 S.E.2d 168 (1972), appeal dismissed, 409 U.S. 907 (1972).
132. 56 Cal. App. 2d 635, 133 P.2d 64 (1943). Maki was overruled by the California Supreme
Court in Lancaster v. Municipal Court, 6 Cal. 3d 805, 494 P.2d 681, 100 Cal. Rptr. 609 (1972),
on the basis that the state penal statute prohibiting illicit sexual behavior pre-empted the
field. Thus, the California court did not reach the claim that the opposite sex provision was
unconstitutional.
133. 212 Va. at 696, 187 S.E.2d at 171. The court also held that the provision of the
ordinance which placed barber shops in a separate classification than massage parlors was
not a purely arbitrary selection since the barber shop business was fundamentally different
from the massage parlor business. Contra, Cheek v. City of Charlotte, 273 N.C. 293, 160
S.E.2d 18 (1968).
In Kisley and in numerous other state cases which have upheld opposite sex prohibitions,
the courts' logic has closely followed Maki in concluding that once it is established that the
activity has a tendency to induce its participants to commit licentious acts, the state may
reasonably restrict that activity by prohibiting intimate contact among members of the
opposite sex. See, e.g., Anderson v. City of Chicago, 312 Ill. App. 187, 37 N.E.2d 929 (1941);
Cheek v. City of Charlotte, 273 N.C. 293, 160 S.E.2d 18 (1968); Smith v. Keator, 21 N.C.
App. 102, 203 S.E.2d 411 (1968); City of Houston v. Shober, 362 S.W.2d 886 (Tex. Civ. App.
1962); Connell v. State, 371 S.W.2d 45 (Tex. Crim. App. 1963); Gregg v. State, 376 S.W.2d
763 (Tex. Cr. App. 1964); Patterson v. City of Dallas, 355 S.W.2d 838 (Tex. Civ. App. 1962),
appeal dismissed for want of a substantial federal question, 372 U.S. 251 (1963).
Those same courts have also relied upon Maki for the proposition that an ordinance cannot
be said to have discriminated on the basis of sex if its proscriptions apply equally to both
males and females who perform massages for hire.
Nevertheless, the state courts have not been entirely uniform in their approval of prohibi-
tory opposite sex ordinances. The decision in J.S.K. Enterprises, Inc. v. City of Lacey, 6
Wash. App. 43, 492 P.2d 600 (1971), rehearing, 6 Wash. App. 433, 493 P.2d 1015 (1972),
foreshadowed subsequent federal court holdings in finding that an opposite sex prohibition
was an unreasonable exercise of the police power since it classified on the basis of sex and
denied all massagists, regardless of individual characteristics, the right to serve members of
the opposite sex. The court in J.S.K. Enterprises, Inc. recognized that a city in the exercise
of its police powers may regulate massagists on the grounds of public health, safety and
morality, but it specifically declined to follow Maki because it did not "recognize the eco-
nomic, social and legal rights of women and the right of both men and women to be free from
sex discrimination in employment as such rights exist today." Id. at 603.
The court in Geisha House v. Wilson, 43 U.S.L.W. 2153 (D.C. Sup. Ct. Sept. 25, 1974),
interpreted Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971), and Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677
(1973), to mean that classifications based on sex are inherently suspect. The prohibition of
opposite sex massage failed to pass the test of bearing a logical relationship to a legitimate
governmental purpose since by its underinclusiveness it prohibited opposite sex massage only
in "licensed" establishments yet permitted the practice elsewhere. 44 U.S.L.W. at 2153.
Second, as in J.S.K. Enterprises, Inc., the court concluded that the state may not legislate
based upon the "supposition that the participants, somehow, some time, might engage in
criminal conduct." Id. Finally, the court was also persuaded that if the District of Columbia
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peal of the Kisley holding for want of a substantial federal question' 4 was
held to be "perfectly clear precedent," in light of Hicks v. Miranda, for the
Fourth Circuit's dismissal in Hogge v. Johnson3' of an equal protection
challenge to a similarly worded ordinance. Also, in Colorado Springs
Amusements, Ltd. v. Rizzo,'3' the Third Circuit rejected a constitutional
challenge to a municipal ordinance prohibiting opposite sex massage on
the strength of the dismissals of Kisley and two other recent state court
appeals.3 ' The court in Colorado Springs concluded that the Supreme
Court's dismissal in these three cases disposed of the plaintiff's claims
based upon "equal but reprehensible, treatment of both sexes; an invidi-
ously discriminatory sex-based classification; an irrational exception in the
ordinance for massage treatments given under the direction of a medical
practitioner; unreasonable abridgement of the right to pursue a legitimate
livelihood; and the irrebuttable presumption doctrine."'," Thus, until doc-
trinal developments in the Supreme Court suggest that the Court would
be receptive to a re-examination of the sex-based classifications in ques-
tion, the presumption of illicit activity by massagists or other issues now
was convinced that immoral and illegal activities were actually occurring in a given massage
establishment it had an "arsenal of weapons" with which to combat or suppress them, in-
cluding criminal and civil penalties. Id.
Federal courts had generally paralleled in their decisions the reasoning of JS.K. Enter-
prises, Inc. and Geisha House in overturning ordinances prohibiting opposite sex massage.
However, the courts had not been uniform in the emphasis placed upon sex as a sensitive
class, conclusive presumptions, less drastic alternatives and the "fundamental" right to work.
See Colorado Springs Amusements, Ltd. v. Rizzo, 387 F. Supp. 690 (E.D. Pa. 1974), rev 'd,
524 F.2d 571 (3d Cir. 1975); Cianciolo v. Members of City Council, 376 F. Supp. 719 (E.D.
Tenn. 1974) (ordinance held violative of fourteenth amendment and Title VII of Civil Rights
Act of 1964); Valley Health Systems, Inc. v. City of Racine, 369 F. Supp. 97 (E.D. Wis. 1973);
Corey v. City of Dallas, 352 F. Supp. 977 (N.D. Tex. 1972), rev'd on other grounds, 492 F.2d
496 (5th Cir. 1974). Contra, Garaci v. City of Memphis, 379 F. Supp. 1393 (W.D. Tenn. 1974)
(complainant failed to qualify as an employer under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,
and further his rights to privacy were not violated since commercial ventures conducted in
the public forum are not properly within the ambit of the right of privacy).
134. 409 U.S. 907 (1972).
135. 526 F.2d 833 (4th Cir. 1975). Mr. Justice Clark, sitting by designation, stated his dis-
approval of the Supreme Court's statements in Hicks and noted that it was extremely
doubtful that the Court in dismissing the Kisley appeal gave such serious consideration to
the merits of the case as to justify the precedential value assigned to it. Id. at 836.
136. 524 F.2d 571 (3d Cir. 1975).
137. Smith v. Keator, 419 U.S. 1043 (1974), dismissing appeal for want of a substantial
federal question, 285 N.C. 530, 206 S.E.2d 203 (1974); Rubenstein v. Township of Cherry
Hill, 417 U.S. 963 (1974), dismissing appeal for want of a substantial federal question, No.
10,027 (N.J. Sup. Ct., Jan. 29, 1974).
138. 524 F.2d at 576. The court concluded that these issues were disposed of by noting that
they were included as part of the jurisdictional statements in one or more of the appealed
cases.
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disposed of, massage parlor operators would appear to be foreclosed from
mounting a successful constitutional challenge to prohibitive opposite
sex massage ordinances.'39 Since enforcement of such ordinances would be
relatively less difficult than the detection of the illicit and prohibited types
of activity, and since opposite sex contact is an essential feature of most
massage parlors, the economic demise of these businesses in localities with
opposite sex ordinances is almost assured.
2. Challenges Under the Civil Rights Act of 1964
As an alternative to constitutional challenges of ordinances which pro-
hibit massage of patrons by massage parlor employees of the opposite sex,
some parlor operators have successfully contended that by complying with
such ordinances an employer is forced to violate certain provisions of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964.'1o In Cianciolo v. Members of City Council,'4 ' the
court agreed with the massage parlor owner's claim that in complying with
the local ordinance's directive, he is forced "to limit . . his employees
(masseuse or masseur) in (a) way which would deprive or tend to deprive
(an) individual of employment opportunities,"'' thus violating the Act.4 3
The court noted that the basic guidelines in determining whether a sexual
distinction is legitimate have been promulgated by the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission' and that "the Commission has submitted that
the following bases are not sufficient to find a bona fide occupational
qualification:
(i) The refusal to hire women in general based on assumptions of the com-
parative employment characteristics of women in general.
(ii) The refusal to hire an individual based on stereotyped characterization
of the sexes."'
In so noting, the court concluded that since the ordinance in question
complied with neither the spirit nor the letter of section 2000e-2 of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, it must be declared invalid under the supremacy clause
of the Constitution.' 4 Language from other cases similarly suggests that if
a massage parlor operator qualifies as an employer under Title VII
139. See note 130 supra. For a discussion of current Supreme Court doctrine in the area of
equal protection and due process see section I. supra.
140. 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-2(a)(1)-(2) (1974).
141. 376 F. Supp. 719 (E.D. Tenn. 1974).
142. 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-2(a)(2) (1974).
143. 376 F. Supp. at 722.
144. 29 C.F.R. § 1604 et seq. (1975).
145. 376 F. Supp. at 722.
146. Id. at 723. See U.S. Const. art. VI, § 2.
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of the Civil Rights Act,' he may be successful in challenging an opposite
sex ordinance as requiring him to violate the Act's provisions.'
Challenges to such ordinances under the Civil Rights Act, however, may
go the way of Colorado Springs Amusements, Ltd. v. Rizzo' 9 if a recent
interpretation' 0 of the Supreme Court's dismissal of the appeal in
Rubenstein v. Township of Cherry Hill'"' is sustained. In an attempt to
determine if the ruling in Hicks v. Miranda was dispositive of the case
before it, the court in Aldred v. Duling noted that the plaintiff Ruben-
stein's brief to the Supreme Court challenged the local ordinance on four
grounds, one of which was that the ordinance would force Rubenstein to
violate Title VII of the Civil Rights Act.' 2 However, as the court further
noted, the defendant's responsive pleading left some doubt as to whether
Title VII was properly invoked by the plaintiffs in attacking the ordi-
nance.' 3 The colrt stated that it would appear that the Supreme Court
assumed applicability of Title VII when it dismissed Rubenstein's appeal
for want of a substantial federal question,'54 but that given the doubt raised
by the state of the record it was not foreclosed from finding that the instant
challenge under Title VII by a qualified employer still presented a substan-
tial federal question. Nevertheless, the court concluded that it is clear that
by now the "issues surrounding the regulation of massages of one sex by
members of the opposite sex is a matter of local concern presenting no
substantial federal question."' 5
The difficulty with the court's cursory treatment of Title VII, assuming
the Supreme Court did not recognize this as an issue when it dismissed
Rubenstein, is that the standards for establishing discrimination by sex are
different under the fourteenth amendment and the Civil Rights Act.',"
147. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (Supp. 1I1, 1973) defines the term employer as "a person engaged
in an industry affecting commerce who has fifteen or more employees for each working day
in each of twenty or more calendar weeks in the current or preceding calendar year ....
148. See, e.g., Joseph v. House, 353 F. Supp. 367 (E.D. Va.), aff'd sub nom. Joseph v. Blair,
482 F.2d 575 (4th Cir. 1973); Corey v. City of Dallas, 352 F. Supp. 977 (N.D. Tex. 1972)
(dicta), rev'd on other grounds, 492 F.2d 496 (5th Cir. 1974); J.S.K. Enterprises, Inc. v. City
of Lacey, 6 Wash. App. 43, 492 P.2d 600 (1971) (dicta), rehearing, 6 Wash. App. 433, 493 P.2d
1015 (1972).
149. 524 F.2d 571 (3d Cir. 1975).
150. Aldred v. Duling, C.A. No. 76-0002-R (E.D. Va. Jan. 15, 1976).
151. 417 U.S. 963 (1974).
152. C.A. No. 76-0002-R at 3 (E.D. Va. Jan 15, 1976).
153. Id. at 4.
154. Id.
155. Id. at 5.
156. For an excellent discussion of this question see Communications Workers of America,
AFL-CIO v. American Tel. and Tel. Co., 513 F.2d 1024 (2d Cir. 1975). See also Zichy v. City
of Philadelphia, 392 F. Supp. 338 (E.D. Pa. 1975).
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Thus the "issues surrounding the regulation of massages of one sex by
members of the opposite sex"'5 are not disposed of by a Supreme Court
dismissal solely of the issue of equal protection and due process. Since it
would appear that in fact the plaintiff in Rubenstein did not qualify as an
employer under Title VII, " the court should not have avoided the difficult
question of applying the strictures of the Civil Rights Act to the instant
question. Thus, future litigants might successfully contend that until the
Supreme Court either explicitly upholds an opposite sex ordinance in the
face of a Title VII challenge or is clear in its dismissal of such actions for
want of a substantial federal question, a local ordinance prohibiting oppos-
ite sex massage may still be held in violation of the letter and spirit of the
Civil Rights Act.
B. LICENSING 5'
The power of localities to license occupations and establishments as a
means of regulation is accomplished under the police power;'60 the locality
must be given authority to exercise its power of licensing by the state.''
Because the licensing power is exercised within the police power, the power
to license certain occupations has been denied when the object of the
regulation did not affect the health, safety, welfare or morals of the com-
157. C.A. No. 76-0002 at 5 (E.D. Va. Jan. 15, 1976).
158. Id. at 4. Telephone conversation with Steven Weinstein, counsel for Rubenstein. If the
Supreme Court did assume applicability of Title VII to Rubenstein, this lends credence to
former Justice Clark's contention that the Court does not give serious consideration to the
merits of a dismissed case. See note 135 supra. Further, the court in Colorado Springs did
not suggest that the Title VII issue had been presented to the Supreme Court in Rubenstein.
The complainant in the Colorado Springs case, however, failed to qualify as an employer
under the Civil Rights Act. 524 F.2d at 577.
159. An exhaustive study of general restrictions upon licensing is beyond the scope of this
note. Regarding general requirements of procedural due process in licensing see Note, Due
Process Limitations Upon Occupational Licensing, 59 VA. L. REV. 1097 (1973). There is a
helpful discussion of denial, revocation and issuance of licenses in 9 E. MCQuILLIN, MUNICIPAL
CORPORATIONS § 26.80 et seq. (3d rev. ed. 1969). There are three important licensing problems
deserving full discussion because of the significant impact they could have upon massage
parlors: classification schemes, qualification standards, and business regulations..
160. See generally 6 E. McQUILLIN, MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS § 24 (3d rev. ed. 1969).
161. There is generally considered to be no inherent police power in the locality. In many
instances, however, the mere organization of a municipal corporation is sufficient to imply a
delegation by the state to the locality of the police power. Id. § 24.33. It is not necessary that
there be an express delegation to regulate a particular profession or occupation. Courts will
often construe a general grant of authority liberally. Id. § 24.38 et seq. While authority to
license is generally inferred from a general granting of power it is best that such a licensing
power be made explicit and clear. The power of licensing has been denied when it seemed
unclear that the state intended to reach a particular profession. City of Anchorage v. Brady's
Floor Covering, 105 F. Supp. 717 (D. Alas. 1952).
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munity.'62 The regulation of massage parlors has invariably been held to
be within the police power' 3 and thus the parlors are subject to various
licensing schemes.
1. Classification Schemes
The Supreme Court determined in F.S. Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia'"
that any classification ". . . must be reasonable, not arbitrary, and must
rest upon some ground of difference having a fair and substantial relation
to the object of the legislation, so that all persons similarly circum-
stanced shall be treated alike."' 5 Thus any classifications embodied in
the municipal licensing legislation must be based upon natural and reason-
able distinctions germane to the purpose for the licensing.' 6 A subclass
within an occupation may be removed only if it is reasonably insular.'67
Massage parlor classifications have been attacked as being underinclu-
sive in two different respects. Often the massage parlor ordinance will
specifically exclude barber shops, beauty parlors, 6 ' YMCA and YWCA
health clubs'69 and exercise clubs where only one sex is served and no
massages are given.' 0 In Cheek v. City of Charlotte,"' the North Carolina
Supreme Court struck down an exemption of barber shops, beauty parlors
and YMCA and YWCA health clubs. Although noting that "[tlhe city
council felt that the activities which the ordinance seeks to eliminate were
not then being carried on in the exempted establishments," the court held
that favoritism which prevents massage parlor employees "from doing acts
162. See 51 Am. Jun. 2d Licenses and Permits § 14 (1970). Paperhangers, housepainters,
florists, and photographers have often been considered to be engaged in innocuous professions
whose regulation could have no relationship to the health, safety, welfare and morals of the
public. Abdoo v. City and County of Denver, 397 P.2d 222 (Colo. 1964) (portrait photogra-
phers); Roller v. Allen, 245 N.C. 516, 96 S.E.2d 851 (1957) (tile contractors); State v. Gleason,
128 Mont. 485, 277 P.2d 530 (1954) (photographers).
163. See Ex parte Maki, 56 Cal. App. 2d 635, 133 P.2d 64 (1943); 17 A.L.R.2d 1183 (1951).
164. 253 U.S. 412 (1920).
165. Id. at 415.
166. Independent Warehouses, Inc. v. Scheele, 331 U.S. 70 (1947) (tax classification);
Pavone v. Louisiana State Bd. of Barber Examiners, 364 F. Supp. 961 (E.D. La. 1973), aff'd
505 F.2d 1022 (5th Cir. 1974) (distinction drawn between male and female hair to be cut by
cosmetologists is unreasonable); State v. Greenwood, 280 N.C. 651, 187 S.E.2d 8 (1972), rev'g
12 N.C. App. 584, 184 S.E.2d 386 (1971) (no valid distinction between pool hall and bowling
alley operations in light of governmental purpose).
167. See, e.g., Midwest Freight Forwarding Co. v. Lewis, 49 fll. 2d 441, 275 N.E.2d 388
(1971), cert. denied, 408 U.S. 932 (1972).
168. See Kisley v. City of Falls Church, 212 Va. 693, 187 S.E.2d 168 (1972), appeal
dismissed, 409 U.S. 907 (1972); Cheek v. City of Charlotte, 273 N.C. 293, 160 S.E.2d 18 (1968).
169. See Cheek v. City of Charlotte, 273 N.C. 293, 160 S.E.2d 18 (1968).
170. See, e.g., FALLs CHURCH, VA., CODE § 19-1 (1974).
171. 273 N.C. 293, 160 S.E.2d 18 (1968).
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which can be done with impunity under similar circumstances" in a barber
shop or YWCA health club, for example, must not exist.7 2 In Kisley v. City
of Falls Church,'73 the Virginia Supreme Court expressed disagreement
with the Cheek decision. Upholding a statute exempting barber shops and
beauty parlors which offered massages to the scalp, face, neck or upper
part of the body, the court noted that "the types of massages offered are
also different" in that one of the massage parlors in the appeal offered
"massages of 'every part of the body'."'' The court also emphasized the
different hours of operation, different advertising techniques and the an-
cillary character of massages to the primary purposes of barber shops and
beauty parlors.' It is important to note that the exemption in Kisley did
not extend to YMCA and YWCA establishments, which might offer mas-
sages not of the limited scope prescribed for barber shops or beauty parlors.
The distinction between massage parlors and an exempted group would
become less significant if the exempted group offered massages to the same
areas of the body as those subject to the regulation. Thus, if a massage
parlor operator, by choice or by law,', confined massages given to those
areas massaged by operators within the exempted class, he might success-
fully challenge the exemptions conferred, notwithstanding the Kisley hold-
ing.
Another exemption almost uniformly carved out of massage ordinances
is that granted to the healing arts.'77 This exemption, initially upheld in
Ex parte Maki, 7 has been seldom challenged. The court in Maki reasoned
that there were substantial distinctions between the moral trustworthiness
of the physician and the massagist' 5 as well as between the professions in
general. 8 ' The sparseness of later case law on the distinction drawn in
172. 273 N.C. 293, 160 S.E.2d 18, 23 (1968).
173. 212 Va. 693, 187 S.E.2d 168, appeal dismissed, 409 U.S. 907 (1972).
174. Id. at 698, 187 S.E.2d at 172.
175. Id.
176. Many statutes contain prohibitions of genital contact. These ordinances remove a
significant distinction which may have served as a basis of classification.
177. See, e.g., Ex parte Maki, 56 Cal. App. 2d 635, 133 P.2d 64 (1943).
178. Id.
179. 133 P.2d at 69. "The physician is obligated not only to adhere to the application of
the most advanced methods and remedies in the art of healing but also to scorn immoral
behavior and to denounce licentious practices .... [The massagist] has no professional
standards to uphold. His endeavors are activated by only a personal zeal to promote his own
prosperity." The Maki court also pointed out that the practice of medicine was already under
state supervision. Id. 133 P.2d 69.
180. "The massage ... is practiced by every mother in the land in the normal care of her
children. Because it puts the infant to sleep or relaxes the fatigued laborer does not place it
in the category of the arts of a physician any more than does applying hot towels to an aching
back or an ice pack to a bruised body." Id.
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Maki seems indicative of its acceptance. ' This exemption is often phrased
in terms of location rather than the doctor-patient relationship.," The
validity of such an exemption for doctors and other health care profession-
als seems clear, especially in light of the rationale in Maki.',,
2. Qualifications
As noted earlier,'84 because the regulation and licensing of massage par-
lors are accomplished through the police power, it is necessary that "any
qualification have a rational connection with the applicant's fitness."'
The Supreme Court distinguishes between the denial of a license to follow
a particular profession by a licensing board'86 and the denial of a single job
opportunity.'87 The granting of a license may vest a person with a property
right which may not be revoked without following certain procedural safe-
guards.' 8 Three distinct requirements have been imposed upon prospec-
tive licensees of massage parlors: skill and knowledge, health and
character. The common denominator for their validity is that they must
not be an unreasonable exercise of the police power.
181. Cf. Smith v. Keator, 21 N.C.App. 102, 203 S.E.2d 411, aft'd, 285 N.C. 530, 206 S.E.2d
203 (1973), appeal dismissed, 419 U.S. 1043 (1974). In Smith, the court noted that massage
was not an "art of healing" (and thus pre-empted by the state from local control) in spite of
a ruling by the Commissioner of the Revenue that massagists had to obtain state licenses for
those "practicing any professional art of healing for a reward or a fee." 203 S.E.2d at 415.
182. See, e.g., ALEXANDRIA, VA. CODE § 20A-1 (1974); CHESAPEAKE Crry, VA., CODE § 12-15
(1974): "Excluded are the following: Hospitals, nursing homes, medical clinics, offices or
quarters of duly licensed physicians, chiropractors, osteopaths. .. ."
183. One might question the insertion of nursing homes, for the doctor-patient relationship
might not be present there. Such massages might be given without medical consultation.
However, the logic of the Kisley decision might still allow for an exemption upon grounds
other than this doctor-patient relationship essential in the Maki holding.
184. See discussion of classification schemes in text, Section IV. B. 1 supra.
185. Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners, 353 U.S. 232 (1957). "Obviously an applicant
could not be excluded merely because he was a Republican or a Negro or a member of a
particular church." Id. at 239. Even in applying permissible standards, state officers "cannot
exclude an applicant when there is no basis for their finding that he fails to meet these
standards or when their action is invidiously discriminatory." Id. The due process and equal
protection clauses of the fourteenth amendment apply to the licensing of occupations. Id.;
Douglas v. Noble, 261 U.S. 165 (1923).
186. Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134, 179 (1974) (plurality decision; opinion of White,
J.); Willner v. Committee on Character, 373 U.S. 96 (1963); Schware v. Board of Bar Examin-
ers, 353 U.S. 232, 238 (1957). See also Hornsby v. Allen, 326 F.2d 605 (5th Cir. 1964).
187. Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972). "It stretches the concept too far to
suggest that a person is deprived of 'liberty' when he simply is not rehired in one job but
remains as free as before to seek another." Id. at 575.
188. Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134, 180 (1974) (opinion of White, J.).
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Each massagist employed may be required to possess certain skills and
knowledge.'89 Applicants may be required to attend school for training as
a massagist.9 0 However, the requirements must be reasonably necessary to
protect the public from being misled or mistreated by incompetent mas-
sagists. 191 Although courts are extremely deferential with respect to skill
requirements in general, they have been willing to strike down provisions
which they believe required knowledge or skill only ancillary to the occupa-
tion involved.9 2 The Florida Supreme Court in Snedeker v. Vernmar,
Ltd.'93 struck down skill and knowledge requirements of massagists as
applied to operators of mechanical tables which provided "passive exer-
cise" of muscles. Although there was a chance of injury to persons with pre-
existing abnormalities, the court held that the requirement of "not less
than 600 hours of instruction in physiology, anatomy, massage, hydrother-
apy and other techniques of the trade"'94 would not ". . . enable an opera-
tor to diagnose such conditions or eliminate that risk."'95 Thus the course
in technical training ". . would not make the appellees more competent
in their particular occupation. . . ." 98To successfully challenge any mas-
sage skill or knowledge requirement, it is necessary to establish that the
requirement does not further the competency of the massagist in his or her
occupation.'97 Whether the challenge can be successful will depend upon
189. Rogers v. Miller, 401 F. Supp. 826 (E.D. Va. 1975). The court upheld a requirement
that a massagist complete a course of study in body massage in connection with an approved
school of instruction. A "course of study" was defined as one thousand hours of study. Five
hundred hours must be instructional hours. The additional five hundred hours may be accom-
plished simultaneously with "on the job training."
190. Id. Cf. Douglas v. Noble, 261 U.S. 165 (1923) (dentist required to attend dental
school); Montejano v. Rayner, 33 F. Supp. 435 (D. Idaho 1939) (barbers required to attend
barbering school and undergo apprenticeship).
191. Cf. Montejano v. Rayner, 33 F. Supp. 435, 439 (D. Idaho 1939).
192. Thus, requiring a funeral director to meet an embalmer's qualifications by attending
a school in mortuary science has been struck down by several courts. Cleere v. Bullock, 361
P.2d 616 (Colo. 1961); Gholson v. Engle, 9 Ill. 2d 454, 138 N.E.2d 508 (1956). While it is
permissible to require would-be barbers to have knowledge of bacteriology and physiology of
the muscles and nerves of the neck and head, Sellers v. Philip's Barber Shop, 46 N.J. 340,
217 A.2d 121 (1966), it is unreasonable to require barbers to have knowledge of "massaging
and manipulating the muscles of the upper part of the body and knowledge of diseases of the
nails of a person." Montejano v. Rayner, 33 F. Supp. 435, 439 (D. Idaho 1939).
193. 151 So. 2d 439 (Fla. 1963).
194. Id. at 440.
195. Id. at 442.
196. Id.
197. See note 185 supra. The court in Rogers v. Miller, 401 F. Supp. 826 (E.D. Va. 1975),
rejected attacks based upon the unconstitutional vagueness of the statute. In examining
whether the one thousand hours required in training was excessive, the court compared this
requirement with the training requirement for barbers (1,248 accredited training hours).
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the specifics of the given case. Insofar as skill, schooling and knowledge
requirements in similar occupations have been upheld, 98 overcoming the
presumption of validity afforded these requirements will be difficult.
Health requirements may also be imposed upon the licensee. Most often
these have taken the form of denying applications of those who have "con-
tagious or communicable diseases" at the time of licensing. '99 Furthermore,
if while licensed, the licensee contracts a communicable disease, he or she
is often prohibited from continuing work as a massagist.2 0 0 A locality may
require a physical examination in order to insure these provisions are
followed.2"' The test for such health requirements is, again, whether or
not they are reasonably related to the health, safety and welfare of the
community. It is noteworthy that such health requirements for massage
parlors have not been seriously questioned or struck down by courts pass-
ing upon ordinances containing them."'2
Character fitness of the applicant may also be required by licensing
authorities. In addition to the concern it has for totally precluding a per-
son's opportunity to follow his or her chosen occupation,2 3 the Supreme
Court has determined that procedural due process requirements apply
where an administrative determination may damage one's "standing and
associations in one's community. 2 4 Because reputation is integral to the
concept of liberty, "where a person's good name, reputation, honor, or
integrity is at stake because of what the government is doing to him, notice
and an opportunity to be heard are essential.""2 5 Thus procedural due
process is necessary when a board's refusal to license is based upon a
finding of inadequate moral character. 29
Thus, the court was unwilling to hold that the requirement did not further the expertise of
the massagist.
198. Montejano v. Rayner, 33 F. Supp. 435 (D. Idaho 1939); Sellers v. Philip's Barber Shop,
46 N.J. 340, 217 A.2d 121 (1966). See Valley Health Systems, Inc. v. City of Racine, 369 F.
Supp. 97 (E.D. Wis. 1973) where the court did not even discuss the requirement of graduation
from a massage school.
199. ALEXANDRIA, VA., CODE § 20A-3 (1974); JAMES Crry CouNTY, VA., Ord. 87, § 9-113.1-10
(May 12, 1975); NORFOLK, VA., CODE § 7.1-18 (1974); HAiPrON, VA., CODE § 22.1-9 (1972).
200. ALEXANDRIA, VA., CODE § 20A-10 (1974); HAMiPON, VA., CODE § 22.1-9 (1972).
201. NORFOLK, VA., CODE § 7.1-18 (1974).
202. See, e.g., Hogge v. Hedrick, 391 F. Supp. 91 (E.D. Va. 1975).
203. See note 186 supra.
204. Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 573 (1972).
205. Wisconsin v. Constan'tineau, 400 U.S. 433, 437 (1971); Hogge v. Hedrick, 391 F. Supp.
91, 110 (E.D. Va. 1975). Cf. Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134 (1974); Board of Regents v. Roth,
408 U.S. 564 (1973), where decisions were based upon the premise that lack of moral character
was not instrumental in the administrative determinations.
206. Id.
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Many localities rely upon what might be termed "legislative litmus
tests" in making the determination of character fitness. Such litmus tests
involve a determination by the legislative body writing the ordinance that
certain factors shall conclusively demonstrate the fitness or lack of fitness
of an individual to pursue a particular occupation."'7 Factors upon which
the legislative body places such extreme importance must, however, be
reasonably related to the applicant's fitness."0 8 A frequent factor given
conclusive status is the commission of a crime involving moral turpitude.
Conclusionary determinations of lack of fitness can be placed at various
stages of prosecution for a crime: arrest,0 ' the filing of formal charges,
210
the plea of nolo contendere'l and conviction.2 1
2
In Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners,2 13 the Supreme Court assessed
the reasonableness of these litmus tests of criminal prosecution stages.
Although mere arrest seemed to be of little probative value, the filing
of formal charges or conviction upon those charges carried more weight."4
The test appears to be whether it is reasonable to conclude that the
criminal activity can be considered determinative of the applicant's
character fitness at the time of the licensing application.1 5 Although the
Supreme Court is willing to defer to reasonable legislative litmus tests, it
207. See. e.g., HENRICO CO., VA., CODE § 17-11(b) (1974): "The Chief of Police shall issue
the permit when the applicant has fully complied ... [with payment of fees and medical
examination] unless. . . (b) The applicant has, within five (5) years immediately preceding
the date of the filing of the application, been convicted of or pleaded nolo contendere to or
forfeited bond on any felonious criminal charge or any misdemeanor criminal charge involving
theft of property, assault or battery, drugs, or violations of Article I of Chapter 4 of Title 18.1
of the Code of Virginia."
208. Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners, 353 U.S. 232, 239 (1957); Baker v. Columbus
Municipal Sep. School Dist., 329 F. Supp. 706 (N.D. Miss. 1971).
209. Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners, 353 U.S. 232 (1972). "The mere fact that a man
has been arrested has very little, if any, probative value in showing that he has engaged in
any misconduct. . . . When formal charges are not filed against the arrested person and he
is released without trial, whatever probative force the arrest may have had is normally
dissipated." Id. at 241.
210. Id.; J.S.K. Enterprises, Inc. v. City of Lacey, 6 Wash. App. 43, 492 P.2d 600 (1971)
(if licensee is charged with prostitution, then the board has authority to revoke the license).
211. Berardi v. Rutter, 23 N.J. 485, 129 A.2d 705 (1957); 89 A.L.R. 540, 606 et seq. (1963).
The general rule is that legislative litmus tests relying on nolo contendere pleas are valid.
212. See, e.g., HENRICO CO., VA., CODE § 17-11(b) (1974).
213. 353 U.S. 232 (1972).
214. Id. at 241 et seq. The Supreme Court thought that the significance of the filing of
formal charges or conviction was to some degree dependent upon how long ago the crime
occurred and the nature of the crime itself. Id. at 243.
215. In re Dreier, 258 F.2d 68 (3d Cir. 1958). "[D]istrict court should . . . grant it [the
license] unless . . . [the] applicant is not presently of good moral or professional character."
Id. at 70.
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will not allow arbitrary standards to be used in the granting or denial of
licenses." 6 Thus, statutes which barred a would-be massagist from a li-
cense upon the basis of a criminal conviction without considering when the
conviction occurred '17 or the nature of the criminal act might be success-
fully opposed. One court has enjoined the enforcement of a provision which
would prohibit the issuance of a massage operator's license to any corpora-
tion with a stockholder owning more than 5% of the stock who has a
significant criminal record." '1
Ordinances may also rely upon a determination by an administrative
official of the applicant's character independent of such litmus tests. Pro-
cedural due process is essential in these instances. 29 There should be an
opportunity for the applicant to submit evidence, cross-examine and know
the reasons for the administrative determination upon the application.2 1
The issue in the administrative official's deliberations should be whether
the applicant is presently of sufficient character; generally, courts have
held that these officials cannot make a decision based upon one factor
alone (e.g., past criminal convictions) but rather must consider all relevant
evidence in determining present fitness.21 What may or may not be re-
quired of an applicant is often a matter of court discretion. 2
216. Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners, 353 U.S. 232 (1957). .. [A]ny qualification
must have a rational connection with the applicant's fitness .... Obviously an applicant
could not be excluded merely because he was a Republican or a Negro or a member of a
particular church." Id. at 239.
217. See, e.g., ALEXANDRIA, VA., CODE § 20A-3.2 (1974) (no time limit on sexual offense;
absolute bar to license).
218. Hogge v. Hedrick, 391 F. Supp. 91 (E.D. Va. 1975), enjoining § 17-6(b) of the Henrico
County, Virginia Code: The Chief of Police shall reject any applicant who has within five
years been' "convicted of or pleaded nolo contendere to or forfeited bond on any felonious
criminal charge or any misdemeanor criminal charge involving theft of property, assault or
battery, drugs. . . . If the applicant is a corporation or a partnership, this provision shall
apply to each stockholder or partnership owning or having in excess of 5% interest of said
corporation or partnership." HENRICO COUNTY, VA. CODE § 17-6(b) (1974).
219. See note 153 supra.
220. Hogge v. Hedrick, 391 F. Supp. 91, 109-10 (E.D. Va. 1975), provides a valuable
discussion of the reasons for and requirements of procedural due process in massage parlor
licensing.
221. Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners, 253 U.S. 232 (1957); In re Dreier, 258 F.2d 68
(3d Cir. 1958); Tanner v. De Sapio, 150 N.Y.S.2d 640 (S. Ct. 1956).
222. See Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners, 353 U.S. 232 (1957), where the Court deter-
mined that "moral character" may not be as expansive a term as the Board urged. Courts
have considered such factors as reputation, Goldberg v. Barger, 37 Cal. App. 3d 987, 112 Cal.
Rptr. 827 (1974); honesty, Hora v. City and County of San Francisco, 233 Cal. App. 2d 375,
43 Cal. Rptr. 527 (1965) (massage parlor case); and possible crimes for which the person was
not convicted, Jenkyns v. Board of Education, 294 F.2d 260 (D.C. Cir. 1961).
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Two massage parlor cases in which a denial of a license was being tested
serve as examples of how courts have approached administrative licensing
determinations. In Hora v. City and County of San Francisco," the court
rejected the appeal of a husband for a massage parlor license because his
wife, the former licensee, had been convicted of "morals charges" on two
occasions. In Sultan Turkish Bath, Inc. v. Board of Police
Commissioners,24 another court refused to overturn the administrative
revocation of a license to a massage parlor operator. Although the court
took note of the many sexual crimes of homosexuality and sodomy which
occurred in the parlor, the court was more concerned with the unwilling-
ness of the operator to take adequate steps to prevent their reoccurrence.2
In summary, character evaluation by administrative officials raised seri-
ous due process concerns. Although courts will pay deference to adminis-
trative determinations upon qualifications of an applicant, it will be re-
quired that the standards imposed be reasonably related to an applicant's
fitness, that administrative discretion be limited, and that certain proce-
dural safeguards be employed in the licensing of massage parlor operators
or technicians when "liberty" or "property" interests are involved.
3. Business Regulation
Since the Supreme Court has indicated that almost total deference is
due a rational legislative choice of the goals and methods of economic and
health regulation, 26 there have been virtually no significant challenges to
local ordinances which regulate these aspects of massage parlor operations.
In Saxe v. Breier,12 an ordinance which limited the daily hours of opera-
tion of a massage parlor to between 8:00 a.m. and 10:00 p.m. was consid-
ered to be a legitimate exercise by a municipality of its police powers, as
was a provision which required keeping a record of the date and hour of
223. 233 Cal. App. 2d 375, 43 Cal. Rptr. 527 (1965). The court rejected petitioner's pledge
that his wife would be uninvolved in the operation of the massage parlor and reasoned that
his wife's two convictions reflected negatively upon his character. 233 Cal. App. 2d 375, 43
Cal. Rptr. 527, 530. Good character "means not only freedom from arrests or accusations, but
also vigilance to protect others closely associated with the applicant from wrongdoing in their
occupation." Id.
224. 169 Cal. App. 2d 188, 337 P.2d 203 (1959).
225. 169 Cal. App. 2d 188, 337 P.2d 203, 203. Although the operator had hired a watchman
and provided "peepholes" by which the watchman might prevent continual wrongdoing, the
court was concerned with the fact that the operator had told the watchman not to monitor
his patrons' activities closely. Id. It is this tolerance of the illegal activities to which the court
pointed in affirming the administrative revocation. Id.
226. Ratner, The Function of the Due Process Clause, 116 U. PA. L. Rv. 1048 (1968).
227. 390 F. Supp. 635 (E.D. Wis. 1974).
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each massage, the name and address of the patron and the name of the
administering technician. ' In Valley Health Systems, Inc. v. City of
Racine,"2 9 the court held that typical provisions requiring the maintenance
of minimum physical plant standards and provisions for individual locker,
dressing and shower rooms for male and female patrons were reasonable.
Despite the courts' general acceptance of the reasonableness of these
types of regulations, not all of these ordinances have gone unchallenged.
For example, in Hogge v. Hedrick 0 the court suggested that the county
had failed to provide a rational basis for the "unique" provision which
required maintenance of records of patrons. The court was troubled by the
fact that this requirement placed a greater burden upon the massage es-
tablishments than other commercial establishments.2 1 The Hogge court
also suggested that the requirements that the main entrance doors remain
unlocked may not be rationally related to the furtherance of the health and
safety purposes of the ordinance.232
An examination of local ordinances which have been enacted to regulate
the operations of business establishments and which have been unsuccess-
fully challenged in the courts leads to the inevitable and accepted conclu-
sion that most municipal ordinances coming to the courts bring with them
a presumption of reasonableness and constitutionality.233 Further, health
measures, like business regulations generally, have evoked the most ex-
treme judicial deference in recent years. 4 Therefore, challenges to their
constitutionality may normally be successful only if by clear and convinc-
ing evidence the ordinance has no reasonable tendency to preserve the
public health and morality.
C. FEES AND TAXES
As previously noted,2 35 the locality can exercise only that power which
has been delegated to it by the state. Any fees which are levied against a
228. Id. at 636.
229. 369 F. Supp. 97 (E.D. Wis. 1973).
230. 391 F. Supp. 91, 100 (E.D. Va. 1974).
231. Id. It may be argued that record-keeping requirements are reasonably related to the
state's interest in tracing the sources of contagious disease; but, as the court noted, this same
consideration should require localities to insist that barber shops, for example, providing
massages maintain similar records. At least on this basis, the distinction drawn in Kisley v.
City of Falls Church, 212 Va. 693, 698, 187 S.E.2d 168, 172 (1972), between barber shops and
massage parlors would appear to lack validity. See section IV. B. 1. supra.
232. 391 F. Supp. at 107.
233. See generally 1 C. ANTIEAU, MUNICIPAL CORPORATION LAW chs. V and VI (1974).
234. Gunther, Foreward: In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model
for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARv. L. REv. 1, 32 (1972). See section I. C. 1 supra.
235. See section II. supra.
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particular occupation must be examined within this context. It is impor-
tant to distinguish the purposes behind any fee. A fee may be invalid if a
locality was given authority to impose fees only for certain purposes to the
exclusion of others."' Different restrictions may result from a determina-
tion that a particular fee has been levied for taxation rather than to recoup
regulatory costs.237 The courts have applied various tests in determining
what is a regulatory fee and what is a revenue measure.28
1. Regulatory Fees
A regulatory fee239 is one which is imposed for the purpose of defraying
the cost of processing and inspecting regulated businesses. It is generally
held that the grant of authority to regulate a given business carries with it
236. Weber Basin Home Builders Ass'n. v. Roy City, 26 Utah 2d 215, 487 P.2d 866 (1971).
Cf. Rogers v. Miller, 401 F. Supp. 826 (E.D. Va. 1975) (massage parlor case).
237. City of Columbus v. Migqdadi, 195 N.E.2d 923 (Columbus Mun. Ct. 1963); City of
Lovington v. Hall, 68 N.M. 143, 359 P.2d 769 (1961).
238. Courts use different language in describing the threshold between a regulatory and
revenue measure. Many courts rely upon an examination of the legislative purpose as a means
of determining which power is being exercised. State v. Jackson, 60 Wis. 2d 700, 211 N.W.2d
480 (1973); Weber Basin Home Builders Ass'n. v. Roy City, 26 Utah 2d 215, 487 P.2d 866
(1971). Some courts have held that the revenues from a regulatory measure which exceed the
actual cost of the administration and enforcement of the regulations are to be considered as
a tax. Metropolitan D.C. Refuse Haulers Ass'n v. Washington, 479 F.2d 1191 (D.C. Cir.
1973). Some courts have suggested that mere excess revenue above the cost of regulation does
not necessarily invalidate the excess fees as a regulatory measure. Village of Roxana v.
Costanzo, 41111. 2d 423, 243 N.E.2d 242, 243 (1968) ("[T]he mere probability that the license
fee may exceed [the cost of regulation] . . . will not render the ordinance invalid as a reve-
nue measure."); City of Beloit v. Lamborn, 182 Kan. 288, 321 P.2d 177, 182 (1958); Garden
State Racing Ass'n v. Township of Cherry Hill, 42 N.J. 454, 201 A.2d 554 (1964); Silco
Automatic Vending Co. v. Puma, 108 N.J. Super. 427, 261 A.2d 674, 676 (1970); City of
Chattanooga v. Veatch, 304 S.W.2d 326 (Tenn. 1957). Cf. Postal Tel.-Cable Co. v. Borough
of Taylor, 192 U.S. 64, 70 (1904) ("If it were possible to prove in advance the exact cost
that sum would be the limit of the law."). If it is clear that there are no regulation costs or
conditions attached at all, then nearly all courts would consider any licensing fee imposed as
a revenue measure, regardless of.its stated purpose or how it is identified. City of Florissant
v. Eller Outdoor Advertising Co., 522 S.W.2d 330, 332 (Mo. Ct. App. 1975); City of Lovington
v. Hall, 68 N.M. 143, 359 P.2d 769 (1961). One of the few definitive statements which can be
made with impunity concerning the distinction between regulatory and revenue fees is that
the courts have achieved little uniformity in making the distinction. The need to make the
distinction dissipates when a municipality having authority to issue both fees does so in one
assessment. Rogers v. Miller, 401 F. Supp. 826 (E.D. Va. 1975).
239. The terms "licensing fee" or "licensing tax" normally are used to describe fees im-
posed to recover costs involved in a system of regulation. Readers of ordinances and cases
should be aware, however, that many courts and ordinances use these terms to describe
occupational revenue measures as well. For this reason, the term "regulatory fee" is used in
this note.
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the power of localities to impose regulatory fees. 4 ' The party questioning
the regulatory fee, generally presumed to be reasonable, bears the burden
of showing its unreasonableness. 4 ' In determining the reasonableness of
the relationship between the cost incurred and the fee imposed, most
courts have allowed the locality to include indirect costs of administering
and enforcing the police regulation 4' and additional burdens the business
might impose upon the community's resources.243 The majority of courts
seems to hold that a mere excess of revenue over regulatory costs does not
invalidate the measure. 4 '
It is generally held that a licensing fee must not be so high as to be
prohibitory or confiscatory of the business regulated. 4' Some courts go so
far as to suggest this to be true even if the cost of the regulation is commen-
surate with the fee. 46 The fact that an individual businessman cannot
240. ABC Sec. Serv. Inc. v. Miller, 514 S.W.2d 521 (Mo. 1974). See generally 9 E.
MCQUILLIN, MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS § 26.28 (3d rev. ed. 1969).
241. Monarski v. Alexandrides, 80 Misc. 2d 260, 362 N.Y.S.2d 976, 982 (1974); Common-
wealth v. Winfree, 408 Pa. 128, 182 A.2d 698, 703 (1962) ("doubt should be resolved in favor
of the reasonableness of the fee").
242. Merrelli v. City of St. Clair Shores, 355 Mich. 575, 96 N.W.2d 144 (1959).
243. Garden State Racing Ass'n. v. Township of Cherry Hill, 42 N.J. 454, 201 A.2d 554
(1964). These costs, one court noted, "must be established by reasonably accurate accounting
procedures and not. . . by mere 'guestimate' . . . unsupported by other than speculation."
Merrelli v. City of St. Clair Shores, 355 Mich. 575, 96 N.W.2d 144, 150 (1959). Yet it is clear
that it is "not essential that the fee constitute the exact or precise expense." ABC Sec. Serv.
Inc. v. Miller, 514 S.W.2d 521 (Mo. 1974); accord, Opinion of the Justices, 290 A.2d 869 (N.H.
1972).
244. See note 238 supra. Courts use different language in describing the threshold between
a regulatory and revenue measure. Opinion of the Justices, 290 A.2d 869, 872 (N.H. 1972)
("clearly and materially exceed"); City of Beloit v. Lambom, 182 Kan. 288, 321 P.2d 177
(1958) ("flagrantly excessive"); City of Richmond Heights v. LoConti, 19 Ohio App. 2d 100,
250 N.E.2d 84, 94 (1969) ("wholly out of proportion to any burden imposed upon the munici-
pality"). Cf. Postal Tel.-Cable Co. v. Borough of Taylor, 192 U.S. 64, 70 (1904). A licensing
tax imposed under the guise of the police power for the purpose of producing revenue will be
struck down. City of Georgetown v. Morrison, 362 S.W.2d 289 (Ct. App. Ky. 1962); City of
Lovington v. Hall, 68 N.M. 143, 359 P.2d 769 (1961); Weber Basin Home Builders Ass'n. v.
Roy City, 26 Utah 2d 215, 487 P.2d 866 (1971). In addition to examining any excess in
revenues, some courts have compared the fee imposed upon the particular licensees similarly
circumstanced. Gilbert v. Town of Irvington, 20 N.J. 432, 120 A.2d 114 (1956).
245. See 3 C. ANTIEAU, MUNICIPAL CORPORATION LAw § 24.11 (1974).
246. Id. One court has noted that licensing itself contemplates the existence of the business
to be regulated. City of Washington v. Thompson, 160 N.E.2d 568 (C.P. Ohio 1949). Some
older opinions draw a distinction between occupations harmful in themselves (which may be
prohibited through excessive licensing fees) and those activities which are not harmful (and
cannot be prohibited in such a fashion). See cases cited in Section I. supra. As the comments
in that section and later cases indicate, the vitality of this distinction has been sharply
curtailed.
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make a profit does not make a regulatory fee prohibitive, so long as the
fee does not prohibit that class of business activity in the community. 47
Hence, a regulatory fee (if reasonably related to the cost of regulating the
enterprise) may be so high as to prevent some persons from entering the
business or even drive out small entrepreneurs while enabling larger busi-
nesses to survive.'48 Although regulatory fees may not be set at such a
prohibitive level as to drive all massage parlors out of business, these fees
might still function as a practical deterrent to many massage parlor opera-
tors if they reasonably relate to the costs of administering the regulations
imposed.
2. Business Taxes
Courts approach tax measures quite differently than they approach reg-
ulatory fees. A locality may ordinarily impose occupational taxes upon
businesses for the purpose of raising revenue. Courts require a locality be
given by the state an express grant of authority to impose such revenue
measures and are unwilling to imply such authority from the state.24 9 Once
proper authoriztion is shown, courts accord taxation extreme deference.
The Supreme Court in Madden v. Kentucky"' and Lehnhausen v. Lake
Shore Auto Parts Co.25' established that the presumption of constitution-
247. Tom's Tavern Inc. v. City of Boulder, 526 P.2d 1328 (Colo. 1974); Springston v. City
of Fort Collins, 518 P.2d 939 (Colo. 1974) (proof that tax is not prohibitive is that some
businesses have paid the tax and are still open); City of Miami v. I.C. Sales, Inc., 276 So. 2d
214 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1973).
248. Id.
249. 2A C. ANTIEAU, MUNICIPAL CORPORATION LAW § 21.00 (Supp. 1975); City of Plymouth
v. Eisner, 28 Wis. 102, 135 N.W.2d 799, 802 (1965) ("clear and express language" of the grant
is required; doubt to be resolved in favor of the person challenging the tax.).
250. 309 U.S. 83 (1940).
251. 410 U.S. 356 (1973). The Court noted that, where taxation is concerned and no specific
federal right apart from equal protection is involved, the state has "large leeway" in making
classifications. Id. at 359. Mr. Justice Douglas, speaking for a unanimous Court, quoted from
Allied Stores of Ohio, Inc. v. Bowers, 358 U.S. 522, 526-27 (1959), which held that, although
states were subject in tax measures to the equal protection clause, they may "impose different
specific taxes upon different trades and professions" unless such taxes are "palpably
arbitrary" or "invidious." Lehnhausen v. Lake Shore Auto Parts Co., 410 U.S. 356, 359-60
(1973). The cases cited by the Court indicated the wide latitude given to the states in tax
measures. See Madden v. Kentucky, 309 U.S. 83 (1940), upholding a discrepancy in tax
between money on deposit in the state and outside the state. The Court noted that "in
taxation, even more than in other fields, legislatures possess the greatest freedom in classifica-
tion." Id. See also Lawrence v. State Tax Commission, 286 U.S. 276 (1932), upholding a
classification distinction between individuals and corporations obtaining revenue outside the
state. The Second Circuit interpreted the Lehnhausen case as sustaining the tax "although
classifications were not perfectly related to the stated purpose." Becker v. Levitt, 489 F.2d
1087 (2d Cir. 1973).
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ality can'be overcome only by the most explicit demonstration that a
classification is a hostile and oppressive discrimination against particular
persons and classes. In this regard, taxes do not need to be related to the
cost of any regulatory measure imposed upon a given business., ' Exactly
how onerous the localities can make these fees seems unclear in light of
dicta in the Supreme Court's decision in Lehnhausen.5 s In holding the
classification scheme valid, Mr. Justice Douglas noted: "State taxes which
have the collateral effect of restricting or even destroying an occupation or
a business have been sustained, so long as the regulatory power asserted
is properly within the limits of the federal-state regime created by the
Constitution."' 1 The Court in A. Magnano Co. v. Hamilton255 had upheld
Washington State's tax upon oleomargarine while exempting butter."6 The
oleomargarine manufacturer had claimed that the tax was fashioned in
order to make its costs of manufacturing oleomargarine prohibitive. The
Supreme Court rejected the appellant's argument by noting that a tax will
be struck down "[o]nly if the act be so arbitrary as to compel the conclu-
sion that it does not involve an exertion of the taxing power, but consti-
tutes, in substance and effect, the direct exertion of a different and forbid-
den power . . . ."2 Even though it destroys "particular occupations or
businesses" it will be upheld unless "its necessary interpretation and effect
be such as plainly to demonstrate that the form of taxation was adopted
as a mere disguise .... ."I" The Court determined that the primary in-
quiry is not whether a lawful occupation was destroyed by the tax but
whether the primary purpose of the tax was to accomplish the occupation's
destruction.',
In 1974 the Supreme Court expressly reaffirmed the Magnano reasoning
252. Rogers v. Miller, 401 F. Supp. 826 (E.D. Va. 1975); Springston v. City of Fort Collins,
518 P.2d 939 (Colo. 1974).
253. 410 U.S. 356 (1973).
254. Id. at 360. The Court appears to be making reference to the requirement that no state
tax burden interstate commerce.
255. 292 U.S. 40 (1934).
256. "It is obvious that the differences between butter and oleomargarine are sufficient to
justify their separate classification" for taxation purposes. Id. at 43.
257. Id. at 44.
258. Id.
259. "Taxes are occasionally imposed ... in the discretion of the legislature on proper
subjects with the primary motive of obtaining revenue from them and with the incidental
motive of discouraging them by making their continuance onerous. They do not lose their
character as taxes because of the incidental motive. But there comes a time in the extension
of the penalizing features of the so-called tax when it loses its character as such and becomes
a mere penalty with the characteristics of regulation and punishment." Id. at 46, quoting
Child Labor Tax Case, 259 U.S. 20, 38 (1922) (emphasis added).
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in City of Pittsburgh v. Alco Parking Corp.6 ' In Alco Parking, the Pennsyl-
vania Supreme Court had ruled that a 20% tax upon the gross receipts of
private parking operators amounted to an unconstitutional taking of their
property in light of the fact that it gave a definite advantage to city-owned
lots not subject to the tax.2"' Nine of the fourteen operators made no profit
and the remainder had only marginal earnings." The lower court had held
that these facts reflected the exercise of a "different and forbidden power"
other than taxation (the confiscation of property).63 The Supreme Court
unanimously reversed. The Court "has consistently refused. . . to hold a
tax . . . unconstitutional because it renders a business unprofitable. '" 64
Even if the revenue resulting had been insubstantial or the revenue pur-
pose only secondary, the Supreme Court indicated it would still "not nec-
essarily treat this exaction as anything but a tax ... " entitled to a pre-
sumption of validity.2"
Thus, the Supreme Court seems to have rejected the argument that a
legitimate business cannot be prohibited through taxation. The Court
seems unwilling to venture too far beyond the stated goals of the tax
ordinance. That a tax is designed to deter a given business in addition to
raising revenue will not cause the Supreme Court to deem the measure
defective.266 Anything short of confiscatory taxes will most likely be ap-
proved under the Magnano and Alco Parking rulings if there is an intent
to derive revenue accompanying the intent to discourage a business.6 7 The
Supreme Court in the Magnano-Alco Parking line of cases indicates that
analysis of the effect of a tax measure upon a legitimate business is not
important in determining a tax's validity. The primary inquiry appears to
260. 417 U.S. 369 (1974).
261. Id. at 373.
262. Id. at 372.
263. Id. at 375.
264. Id. at 373.
265. Id. at 375.
266. Id.
267. Id. An exception to this lihe of cases would be prohibition of occupations or activities
involving first amendment concerns. Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105, 112 (1943)
(religion); Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U.S. 233 (1936) (tax intended to discourage
newspapers with a large circulation). Even prohibitive taxes will be entertained if the tax
could reasonably be viewed as a revenue measure as well, notwithstanding the views of lower
courts. See cases cited in 2A C. ANTIEAU, MUNICIPAL CORPORATION LAW § 21.10 (1974); Tom's
Tavern Inc. v. City of Boulder, 526 P.2d 1328 (Colo. 1974); Springston v. City of Fort Collins,
518 P.2d 939 (Colo. 1974); Garden Spot Market v. E.J. Byrne, 378 P.2d 220 (Mont. 1963).
Some courts distinguish between the prohibition of a harmless occupation and one harmful
in itself in determining whether a locality may issue prohibitive taxes. See the discussion of
this in Section II. supra.
[Vol. 10:597
MASSAGE PARLOR ORDINANCES
be one of motive analysis.2 8 If it is clear that the measure was designed
with the sole (or primary) purpose of eradicating massage parlors, such a
measure would reflect the exercise of a "different and forbidden power"
other than taxation '69 and thus be invalid. This raises several questions.
Are the courts bound by the explicit purposes set forth in the tax ordi-
nance, as Sonzinsky v. United States" ' suggests? If courts cannot reason
the motive from the effect a tax measure has,2' how is such motive to be
determined aside from the stated purposes within the ordinance? Is it
important to distinguish primary and secondary motives? The answers to
these questions remain unclear.
Massage parlor operators when faced with a tax which might be prohibi-
tive will not be successful by merely establishing that the tax effectively
prohibits the exercise of a legitimate occupation. To challenge successfully
such a tax, it is necessary to rebut the presumption that the measure is
intended as a revenue measure. Courts under the guidelines specified in
Alco Parking may consider various factors in determining whether the
presumption favoring the validity of the tax measure has been overcome.
If the tax results in substantial revenue, it is more likely to be viewed as a
revenue measure. 2 That a tax produces little revenue is not determina-
tive, however?3 The fact that an additional motive for the tax is the intent
to discourage the operation of massage parlors is not significant.? It is
less clear how a court should hold if the primary motive of the legislation
is to discourage a business?5 Although the elimination of massage parlors
268. But contrast the Supreme Court's statement in Sonzinsky v. United States, 300 U.S.
506, 513 (1937), that "[i]nquiry into the hidden motives which may move Congress to
exercise a power constitutionally conferred upon it is beyond the competency of courts."
269. A. Magnano Co. v. Hamilton, 292 U.S. 40, 44 (1934).
270. 300 U.S. 506, 513 (1937).
271. Id. See also City of Pittsburgh v. Alco Parking Corp., 417 U.S. 369, 375 (1974).
(There "are several difficulties with [the assertion that the tax represented a confiscation of
property] .... The ordinance on its face recites that its purpose is 'to provide for the eneral
revenue by imposing a tax'. ...").
272. City of Pittsburgh v. Alco Parking Corp., 417 U.S. 369, 375 (1974).
273. Id. The Court referred approvingly to Sonzinsky v. United States, 300 U.S. 506 (1937),
which affirmed the validity of the National Firearms Act. This Act imposed heavy taxes upon
those who sold or manufactured firearms. The Court noted that the Act produced "some
revenue" in that twenty-two persons in the entire United States paid the $200 fee and
therefore it was a valid revenue measure.
274. City of Pittsburgh v. Alco Parking Corp., 417 U.S. 369, 375 (1974).
275. In Magnano, the Court seems to indicate that such a primary motive would render
the tax invalid. "Taxes are occasionally imposed ... in the discretion of the legislature on
proper subjects with the primary motive of obtaining revenue from them and with the
incidental motive of discouraging them by making their continuance onerous." A. Magnano
Co. v. Hamilton, 292 U.S. 40, 46 (1934) (emphasis added). In City of Pittsburgh v. Alco
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through taxation is a question upon which there is little case law,27 6
the principles established in Magnano, Lehnhausen, and Alco Parking
clearly indicate that massage parlor operators would have great difficulty
in challenging any taxes levied against them once the state's grant of the
power of taxation to the locality has been established.
D. ADMINISTRATIVE WARRANTLESS SEARCHES
As an incident to a pervasive massage parlor regulatory scheme, a local
ordinance may authorize officials to conduct routine inspections during
business hours.277 The constitutional problems associated with the free
right of entry into the premises of a licensed business by public officials
for purposes of inspection have been dealt with by the Supreme Court in
a frequently inconsistent manner.7 ' Before examining those cases dealing
with warrantless searches of massage parlors, some general comments on
the nature of the constitutional issues involved should be useful. 279
In Frank v. Maryland,20 the Supreme Court recognized a distinction
between criminal searches and administrative investigations in upholding
Parking Corp., 417 U.S. 369, 375 (1974), the Court indicated that the secondariness of the
revenue motive would not necessarily indicate that the tax was anything other than a tax
measure. "So long as the motive of Congress and the effect of its legislative action are to
secure revenue for the benefit of the general government, the existence of other motives in
the selection of the subjects of taxes can not invalidate Congressional action." Hampton &
Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394, 412-13 (1928).
276. Rogers v. Miller, 401 F. Supp. 826 (E.D. Va. 1975), upholding a $5,000 tax upon
massage parlors.
277. See, e.g., HENRico CO., VA., CODE ch. 17, art. vi. § 17-20 (1974) which reads:
For purposes of conducting routine inspections, officials of the County's Office of
Building Construction and Inspections, the Department of Public Health, and the
Division of Police shall have the right of entry into the premises of any massage
establishment during the hours such massage establishment is open for business. It
shall be unlawful for any person to hinder, delay, prevent or refuse to permit any lawful
inspection or investigation of a massage establishment by any such officer.
278. Sonnereich & Pinco, The Inspector Knocks: Administrative Inspection Warrants
Under an Expanded Fourth Amendment, 24 Sw. L.J. 418, 420 (1970).
279. For a more thorough discussion of the constitutional problems associated with the
administrative warrantless search see generally Rothstein & Rothstein, Administrative
Searches and Seizures: What Happened to Camara and See?, 50 WASH. L. REv. 341 (1975);
Sonnereich & Pinco, The Inspector Knocks: Administrative Inspection Warrants Under an
Expanded Fourth Amendment, 24 Sw. L. J. 418 (1970); Comment, Administrative Inspection
Procedures Under the Fourth Amendment-Administrative Probable Cause, 32 ALBANY L.
REV. 155 (1967); Note, Warrantless Searches of Licensed Businesses, 22 BAYLOR L. REV. 268
(1970); Comment, Administrative Inspection Without a Warrant: Camara v. Municipal
Court and See v. Seattle, 42 CONN. B.J. 255 (1968); Note, Inspections by Administrative
Agencies: Clarification of the Warrant Requirement, 49 NOTRE DAME LAw. 879 (1974).
280. 359 U.S. 360 (1959).
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a fine for refusal to permit a public health inspector to enter a private
dwelling.2' In 1967, Frank was overturned by Camara v. Municipal Court28 2
which extended the fourth amendment warrant requirement to area
inspections of private dwellings to enforce health ordinances. In the com-
panion case of See v. City of Seattle,23 the warrantless inspection was
determined to be also unacceptable in connection with any private area of
a commercial establishment.
The Court has limited its formulation of the warrant requirement in
connection with administrative inspections by carving out a few broad
exceptions.'-" Camara itself excepted from the requirement inspections
that were consented to 5' or accompanied by circumstances that made it
impractical for the official to obtain a warrant 6 and in See the Court was
careful to note that it did not "imply that business premises may not
reasonably be inspected in many more situations than private homes.1287
In Colonnade Catering Corp. v. United States,"8 the Court held that a
liquor dealer could be fined for refusing entry to inspecting federal agents
since liquor dealers under state law have traditionally been subject to
281. Despite that Court's reliance upon the distinction between criminal and administra-
tive search, the Supreme Court had made many statements in the past suggesting that the
fourth amendment is not limited in its application to criminal search only. For example, in
Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 391-92 (1914), the Court said, "The effect of the Fourth
Amendment is ... to forever secure the people, their persons, houses, papers and effects
against all unreasonable searches and seizures under the guise of law. This protection reaches
all alike, whether accused of crime or not . .. ."
Justice Douglas argued in his dissent in Frank that warrantless inspections might be used
by the police in collusion with inspectors to search for evidence of a crime, and further, that
an individual's right of privacy should not be subject to discretionary abuse by the adminis-
trative official in the field. 359 U.S. at 374.
282. 387 U.S. 523 (1967).
283. 387 U.S. 541 (1967).
284. This may be in response to lower courts' arguments that the stringent requirements
of the criminal law in regard to warrants should not be made applicable to administrative
inspections. See, e.g., United States v. Thriftimart, Inc., 429 F.2d 1006 (9th Cir. 1970); United
States v. Hammond Milling Co., 413 F.2d 608 (5th Cir. 1969); United States v. Greenberg,
334 F. Supp. 364 (W.D. Pa. 1971), and to the recognition that such application might frustrate
the administrative agencies in their attempt to preserve the public health, safety and welfare
through administrative inspection. Note, Inspections by Administrative Agencies: Clarifica-
tion of the Warrant Requirement, 49 NOTRE DAME LAW. 879 (1974).
285. 387 U.S. at 539-40.
286. Id. at 539. By its examples, the Court indicated that the definition of such "emer-
gency" circumstances would be more liberally construed than in a criminal context.
287. 387 U.S. at 546-47.
288. 397 U.S. 72 (1970).
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inspection.29 United States v. Biswell9o subsequently laid to rest any sus-
picions that Colonnade may have been sui generis in that it dealt with a
state liquor licensing program that had a tradition of warrantless
searches.2 1' In rejecting the idea that a warrantless search could be justified
on the basis of the licensee's unique historical treatment, the Court may
have paved the way for free right of entry into the premises of any heavily
regulated business.29 2 However, it is clear that Biswell also introduced limi-
tations upon officials' free right of entry.293
Juxtaposing the exceptions provided for licensing programs in See with
the reasoning of Biswell that warrantless inspections are permissible when
exigencies so dictate and the statute is limited in scope, it is difficult to
know if a licensed business such as a massage parlor now has greater
protection from free right of official entry than it did after Frank.
Conceivably a state may assert that a massage parlor license has no genu-
ine expectation of privacy 94 given the need for frequent health inspections.
289. Id. at 76-77. The Court prohibited the introduction into evidence of a criminal pro-
ceeding which had been obtained by federal agents who entered appellant's liquor storage
area by force. While Colonnade teaches that absent emergency and exceptional circumstan-
ces and absent congressional authorization forced warrantless administrative inspection vio-
lated the reasonableness standard of See, 387 U.S. at 545. Nevertheless the case also stands
for the proposition that because of the nature of the business, Congress may provide for the
imposition of fines for refusal to grant entry to inspecting officials.
290. 406 U.S. 311 (1972).
291. Biswell was a pawnshop operator, federally licensed to deal in sporting weapons, who
had acquiesed to a search by federal agents after having been told that a warrant was
unnecessary since the inspection was authorized under the Federal Gun Control Act. Id. at
312. The Supreme Court reversed the lower court decision, 442 F.2d 1189 (10th Cir. 1971),
that Biswell had not validly consented and that the statute authorizing inspections with
neither a warrant nor consent was unconstitutional. The Court analogized a licensee's sub-
mission to ostensible lawful authority to a householder's acquiescence in a search pursuant
to a warrant:
In the context of a regulatory inspection system of business premises that is carefully
limited in time, place, and scope, the legality of the search depends not on consent
but on the authority of a valid statute. 406 U.S. at 315.
292. Lower federal courts have not limited the decision in its application to only licensing
programs involving liquor and firearms control. See, e.g., United States v. Schafer, 461 F.2d
856 (9th Cir. 1972) (Plant Quarantine Act); United States v. Business Builders, Inc., 354 F.
Supp. 141 (N.D. Okla. 1973); United States v. Del Campo Baking Mfg. Co., 345 F. Supp.
1371 (D. Del. 1972) (Food Drug and Cosmetic Act); United States v. Montrom, 345 F. Supp.
1337 (E.D. Pa. 1972) (Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970).
293. The court noted that inspection was crucial in this instance "to prevent violent crime"
which was an "urgent federal interest." Second, proper enforcement of the law was dependent
upon "unannounced, even frequent, inspections" since violations of the law could be quickly
concealed. Finally, the Court required that the statute be "carefully limited in time, place,
and scope." The Court also balanced the "justifiable expectations of privacy" given the
realization by the dealer that he was engaged in a heavily regulated business which must be
subject to "effective inspection" against the possibility of abuse which it found to be "not of
impressive dimensions." 406 U.S. at 315-17.
294. The states may not, of course, impose conditions upon citizens which require the
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It may also be argued that the potential for quick concealment of violations
of health laws necessitates unannounced inspections as the only vehicle for
effective enforcement.
The issue of administrative warrantless inspections of massage parlors
pursuant to statutory authority has been examined in detail in only one
federal case, that of Hogge v. Hedrick.95 In Hogge, massage parlor opera-
tors challenged the constitutionality of certain provisions of a Virginia
county ordinance regulating massage parlors. 8 The court dealt extensively
with the provisions which granted free entry to local health and police
officials and granted a preliminary injunction after having determined that
the plaintiff parlor operators would in all likelihood succeed on the merits
in challenging this provision of the ordinance. 21
The court in Hogge distinguished the problem of national dimension in
Biswell, namely the increase in the crime rate due to uncontrolled traffic
in firearms, from the problems of a local nature unrelated to the incidence
of violent crime.298 The defendant, Henrico County, sought to bring its
warrantless search provision within the Biswell and Camara emergency
exception but the court remained unconvinced that the control of disease
could not be achieved within the limitations of the warrant requirement.299
The court did not deal with the language in See suggesting that a warrant-
less inspection may be permitted pursuant to a valid licensing program,
under exceptional circumstances, but instead suggested that once it is
determined that no emergency existed, the case must be governed by the
administrative search requirements established by Camara."'0
While the logic of Hogge is sound, it would seem that other courts may
decide the issue in a locality's favor on the strength of See and Biswell.
The ordinance in question provided for warrantless inspection only during
relinquishment of constitutional rights, but the unconstitutional conditions doctrine of Frost
& Frost Trucking Co. v. Railroad Comm'n, 271 U.S. 583, 594 (1926), may not apply when a
statute's purpose is to protect societal interests endangered by activity in the regulated area.
Note, Administrative Inspections and the Fourth Amendment, 12 WASHBURN L.J. 203, 214-
15 (1973). See also Note, Unconstitutional Conditions, 73 HARV. L. REV. 1595 (1960).
295. 391 F. Supp. 91 (E.D. Va. 1975). In fact, other federal courts which have had occasion
to mention inspection of massage parlors by officials have done so in the context of approving
such inspections as one of the less onerous alternatives to prohibition of opposite sex mas-
sages. Cianciolo v. Members of City Council, 376 F. Supp. 719 (E.D. Tenn. 1974); Corey v.
City of Dallas, 352 F. Supp. 977 (N.D. Tex. 1972).
296. 391 F. Supp. at 91.
297. Id. at 97.
298. Id. at 99.
299. Id.
300. Id. Since See dealt with the inspection of licensed business premises, it may be argued
that the Court should have logically dealt more extensively with it and relied less on Camara.
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business hours"' and may, in fact, have been necessary to ensure that the
massage parlors continually comply with the provisions of the ordinance
requiring maintenance of sanitary conditions. 2 Nevertheless, it is doubt-
ful that any court would permit a provision to withstand constitutional
attack which gives the local police unlimited right of entry into massage
establishments."' Should the police suspect that a criminal violation is
occurring, they should be bound by the more stringent probable cause
standards required for the issuance of a criminal search warrant.30' Fur-
ther, since the Court in See indicated in a footnote that in certain circum-
stances a warrant may be issued to an inspecting official prior to request
for entry where surprise may be a crucial aspect of routine inspection,0 5
there would seem to be logic in requiring the official to at least prove to a
magistrate that there was administrative probable cause sufficient to jus-
tify the issuance of a warrant.0 Finally, the logic of Hogge is persuasive
in its application of the spirit of the fourth amendment and the language
that pervades Camara, See, Colonnade, and Biswell to the effect that,
except for unusual circumstances in which an urgent regulatory interest
may be proved, the businessman should not be subject to the discretion of
inspecting officials. 7
V. CONCLUSION
Municipalities, acting under the police power, have subjected massage
parlors to extensive regulation. This regulation has taken many forms:
301. "[Ljimited in time, place, and scope." 406 U.S. at 315.
302. HENRICO Co., VA., CODE ch. 17, art. v. (1974).
303. The court in Hogge dealt summarily with this provision in noting that it in effect was
grounded upon the presumption that the massage parlor operators will engage in criminal
conduct which can only be deterred by the knowledge that the police may at any time present
themselves. 391 F. Supp. at 99.
304. Traditional criminal probable cause is said to exist where the facts and circumstances
within an arresting officer's knowledge are sufficient in themselves to warrant a man of
reasonable caution in the belief that an offense is being or has been committed. See Carroll
v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 167 (1925).
305. 387 U.S. at 545 n.6.
306. See note 279 supra for a listing of sources which discuss the less stringent require-
ments of establishing administrative probable cause. It is not clear to what extent an agency
may use evidence uncovered in one of these "civil" searches in a criminal prosecution. See
Note, Administrative Inspection and the Fourth Amendment-A Rationale, 65 COLUM. L.
Riv. 288 (1965).
307. In a footnote, the court rightfully indicated that if the purpose of the challenged
section is to ensure compliance with health and safety regulations, then the county authorities
will not have to meet the more exacting probable cause standards for criminal search and
arrest warrants, whereas if its purpose is to ferret out alleged criminal activity, the authorities
will be held to the more stringent criminal standards in obtaining the warrant. 391 F. Supp.
at 100 n.4.
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opposite sex massage prohibitions, licensing restrictions, various fees im-
posed to defray municipal licensing costs and to raise revenue and admin-
istrative warrantless searches."'
The prohibition of opposite sex massage is not presently vulnerable to
equal protection or substantive due process criticism after Hicks v.
Miranda"9 and the dismissal by the Supreme Court of several appeals "for
want of a substantial federal question. 310 However, Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act remains a viable but relatively uncharted means of attacking
the opposite sex massage prohibition. Licensing restrictions representing
a reasonable exercise of the police power provide another means of regula-
tion. Traditionally courts have shown great deference to legislative judg-
ments as to what is reasonable. Administrative warrantless searches used
in a licensing program raise serious constitutional concerns, yet may be
upheld if limited in scope. Licensing fees will be sustained only if imposed
to defray the costs of regulation and not to raise revenue. If the locality
has been given sufficient taxation powers by the state, a tax may be im-
posed for the purposes of raising revenue. High taxes which accomplish the
elimination of massage parlors will be sustained if a revenue purpose can
be discerned.
Municipalities seem to have a considerable number of tools which might
be employed to either eradicate or substantially reduce the number of
massage parlors in their communities. While some of the devices employed
might be successfully questioned, it seems clear that courts will sustain
many forms of regulation which could result in the elimination of massage
parlors. Increasingly, it appears the locality has the power to say, "Hands
off!"
308. Zoning is an additional tool with which the locality may regulate massage parlors.
See Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc., 44 U.S.L.W. 4999 (U.S. June 24, 1976).
309. 422 U.S. 332 (1975).
310. Smith v. Keator, 419 U.S. 1043, dismissing appeal for want of a substantial federal
question, 285 N.C. 530, 206 S.E.2d 203 (1974); Rubinstein v. Township of Cherry Hill, 417
U.S. 963 (1974), dismissing appeal for want of a substantial federal question, No. 10,027 (N.J.
Sup. Ct. Jan. 29, 1974); Kisley v. City of Falls Church, 409 U.S. 907, dismissing appeal for
want of a substantial federal question, 212 Va. 693, 187 S.E.2d 168 (1972).
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